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COERCIVE ASSIMILATIONISM:
THE PERILS OF MUSLIM WOMEN’S IDENTITY
PERFORMANCE IN THE WORKPLACE
Sahar F. Aziz*
Should employees have the legal right to “be themselves” at work? Most Americans would answer in the negative because work is a privilege, not an entitlement.
But what if being oneself entails behaviors, mannerisms, and values integrally
linked to the employee’s gender, race, or religion? And what if the basis for the
employer’s workplace rules and professionalism standards rely on negative racial,
ethnic or gender stereotypes that disparately impact some employees over others?
Currently, Title VII fails to take into account such forms of second-generation
discrimination, thereby limiting statutory protections to phenotypical or morphological bases. Drawing on social psychology and antidiscrimination literature, this
Article argues that in order for courts to keep up with discrimination they should
expansively interpret Title VII to address identity-based discrimination rooted in
negative implicit stereotypes of low status groups. In doing so, the Article brings to
the forefront Muslim women’s identity performance at the intersection of religion,
race, gender, and ethnicity—a topic marginalized in the performativity literature.1
I argue that Muslim female employees at the intersection of conflicting stereotypes
and contradictory identity performance pressures associated with gender, race, and
religion are caught in a triple bind that leaves them worse off irrespective of their
efforts to accommodate or reject coercive assimilationism at work.2
*
Associate Professor, Texas A&M School of Law., J.D. University of Texas School of
Law; M.A. Middle East Studies, University of Texas. Professor Aziz thanks Professors Richard
Delgado, Gerald Torres, Kevin Johnson, Adrien Wing, Neil Gotanda, Camille Rich, Jose
“Beto” Juarez, Wendy Greene, Ben Davis Shirin Sinnar, and Xuan-Thao Nguyen for their
insightful feedback on earlier versions of this Article. Professor Aziz thanks the Texas A&M
School of Law Librarians for their exceptional research support and her colleagues Huyen Pham,
Meg Penrose, Neal Newman, Michael Green and Milan Markovic at Texas A&M School of Law
for their advice and support throughout the writing of this Article. Special thanks to Ola
Campbell, Reem Moussa, Larissa Maxwell, and Jasmine Culpepper for their diligent research
assistance. All errors are mine alone.
1.
Jen’nan Read & John Bartkowski, To Veil or Not to Veil? A Case Study of Identity
Negotiation Among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 396 (2000). Kimberly
A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7
(2010); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 661-62 (2006).
2.
Irene Browne and Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market, 29
ANN. REV. OF SOC’Y 487, 490 (2003); William H. Turner, Myths and Stereotypes: The African
Man in America, in THE BLACK MALE IN AMERICA, 122, 122 (Doris Y. Wilkinson & Ronald L.
Taylor eds., 1977); see also Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination Against
African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36
WASHBURN L.J. 23, 34-35 (1996) (discussing the stereotypical perceptions of African-American
men by white Americans and by foreigners); Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman,
Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers, 38 SOC. PROBS. 433, 440 (1991) (finding
that 47.2 percent of a survey of Chicago employers surveyed felt that inner-city African-American workers in selected occupations lacked work ethic); Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship – How
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INTRODUCTION
As soon as Sarah Maher walked into the room, their body language
became noticeably tense. She was not what they expected to see when
they spoke to her on the phone. Dressed in an ornate long-sleeve top
extending to her knees with hand stitched colorful Palestinian embroidery, loose black plants, and a matching headscarf, Sarah was identifiIslamophobia is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2012)
(explaining that Arabs have been “collectively indicted . . . as public enemy #1—brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural ‘others’ bent on terrorizing civilized
Westerners especially Christians and Jews, Arabs are brute murderers, sleazy rapists, religious
fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and abusers of women.”); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (1994) (Asians are stereotyped
as the “model minority” implying that “Asian[ ] Americans, through their hard work, intelligence, and emphasis on education and achievement have been successful in American society”).
But see Miranda Oshige McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the “Model Minority Myth”, 100
NW. U.L. REV. 331, 331 (2006) (arguing that the “positive image of Asian Americans as a model
minority conceals a more sinister core of beliefs about Asian Americans and other racial minorities in America”).
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ably Muslim. Her dark olive complexion, long slender nose, and high
cheek bones revealed her Arab roots. And yet, she had no foreign accent, she wore makeup, and exhibited a strength of personality and selfconfidence that contradicted her conservative dress. Within a matter of
minutes, she had lost her audience. Despite having been raised in the
United States, her headscarf quickly marked her as an outsider. Her
Arab features betrayed her seemingly Anglo sounding name. And her
assertive personality came across as pushy with a tinge of self-entitlement. Sarah had failed to assimilate her religious, ethnic, and gender
identity in accordance with the predominant social groups’ norms. Although the company boasted women, Muslims, and racial minorities
among their employees, Sarah was not the “right kind” of minority
employee. Unlike the other Muslim and minority employees, Sarah
openly expressed her identity through her dress rather than attempt to
cover it. Her strong personality and unabashed self-confidence was off
putting for the women and men in the room whose expectations of
professional women included deference, discreteness, and humility. Although the interviewers included a woman, a Muslim, and white
Christian male, they each followed and expected others to follow assimilationist demands, as had they. In the end, they agreed that though
Sarah Maher was well qualified on paper, she just was not the right fit
for the company’s culture.
Unlawful discrimination continues to ail American workplaces.3 Despite the prevailing narrative that America is now “post-racial” after the
election of its first African American president, equal opportunity still
eludes many Americans.4 For Americans who belong to racial, ethnic, or
religious groups stigmatized as the “other,” their opportunities to access
quality education, political office, and equal opportunity in the workplace
are stunted.5
3.
Minna Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1439, 1498 (2008).
4.
See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF
GOOD PEOPLE 86, 186 (2013); Richard Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1803, 1808 (1999); Deborah N. Archer, The Challenge of Teaching the Next Generation of Civil
Rights Lawyers in a “Post-Racial” Society, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 55, 56 (2013). For racial
disparities on full display, one need look no further than the criminal justice system and the
ongoing protests across the country challenging the failure to indict police officers who shot
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri and choked to death Eric Garner in Staten Island, New
York. David Theo Goldberg, Revelations of “Postracial” Ferguson, TRUTHOUT.COM (Dec. 3,
2014), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/27773-revelations-of-postracial-ferguson; Terrence McCoy and Abby Phillip, Eric Garner’s Killing and Why the Police Chokehold is so Racially
Charged, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2014/12/04/why-the-police-chokehold-is-so-racially-charged/.
5.
See Camille Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1163 (2004). Indeed, for the past 17 years the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has reported annual increases in employment discrimi-
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When Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, victims
often experienced explicit biases against their protected group.6 The law’s
immediate effect was to ban overt prejudice causing disparate intergroup
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, color, gender, or religion.7
But, as the data show, the absence of discriminatory policies on paper does
not always translate into a discrimination-free workplace in practice.8
Rather, it pushes bias into more covert manifestations wherein facially
neutral factors become proxies for unlawful discrimination.9 Title VII,
therefore, has been relatively successful in rooting out explicit bias in employment while leaving implicit bias untouched.10
More specifically, Title VII is ill-equipped to prevent two increasingly prevalent forms of discrimination: (1) implicit bias arising from negative stereotypes of protected classes; and (2) disparate treatment of
subgroups of protected classes who do not conform to coercive assimilationist pressures.11 Taking this into account, courts should not exclude intra-group comparative evidence or singularly focus on inter-group

nation charges based on race, gender, and ethnicity. See EEOC Charge Statistics FY 1997
Through FY 2013, available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.
6.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 1-2; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 169. See Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1032 (2006).
7.

Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1009.

8.
Id. at 1001; Rich, supra note 5, at 1190-91; see Johanna Shih, ‘. . .Yeah, I Could Hire
this One, but I Know It’s Gonna Be a Problem’: How Race, Nativity and Gender Affect Employers’
Perceptions of the Manageability of Job Seekers, 25 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 99, 116 (2002); see also
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 86, 148.
9.
See e.g., Rich, supra note 5, at 1136-37. (describing how “voluntary actions” against
facially neutral regulations resulted in “discrimination by proxy”); See generally Elizabeth A.
Deitch et al, Subtle Yet Significant: The Existence and Impact of Everyday Racial Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 HUMAN RELATIONS 1299, 1300-03 (2003).
10.
See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got
To Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1362 (2008) [hereinafter Greene, Title VII]; see,
e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1032; see also Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts,
Testing the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural
Profiling at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369, 369 (2007).
11.
Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 837-39 (1994); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at
1026-27; Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace Appearance Policies, 40
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 289-90 (2009). See Ian Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive?, 55
STAN. L. REV. 2419, 2421 (2002-2003) (noting that much of disparate treatment that occurs
today is based on unconscious biases); see also BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 158-59
(discussing the increase in “aversive racists” who earnestly describe themselves as egalitarian but
nevertheless display subtle forms of race discrimination, such as being more ready to offer help to
whites than Blacks, or subconsciously holding stereotypes against non-whites); see also Roberts &
Roberts, supra note 10, at 387.
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comparative evidence in ascertaining whether unlawful discrimination was
the motivating factor for the adverse employment action.12
Of course, if the different treatment among the subgroups is based on
performance and skills directly related to the work at issue, then no liability should attach. But that is not always the case. Disparate treatment of
members of the same protected class may arise from negative racial, ethnic,
gender, or religious stereotypes that privileges those able and willing to
perform their identity to appease assimilationist demands of the majority
group.13 Such pressures to perform one’s identity in accordance with the
high status groups’ norms and values produce what I call “coercive assmiliationism.” The effect of failing to adhere to coercive assimilationism is
intergroup discrimination based on intragroup differences rooted in implicit or explicit negative stereotyping.14
Female employees who fall under multiple protected classes face an
intersection of identity performance pressures as women, racial or ethnic
minorities, and religious minorities.15 The dominant group’s expectations
of how women or members of minority groups should behave, dress, and
communicate in order to be “professional” are often contradictory due to
conflicting stereotypes.16 A Black woman, for example, who is assertive,
ambitious, and exhibits leadership qualities associated as masculine characteristics risks being stigmatized as aggressive, insubordinate, and threatening because of negative stereotypes of Blacks.17 Simultaneously, her
behavior contradicts gender conformity norms that women should be deferential, gentle, soft spoken, and pleasant.18 And if she is a Muslim, then
12.
Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701, 714-19 (2001) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman]; Krieger &
Fiske, supra note 6, at 1059; Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1491.
13.
See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623,
628 (2006); Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 596
(1999); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2011 (1995); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 771
(2002).
14.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1144, 1163-64; see, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1026;
Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 37, 39 (2009) [hereinafter Harris, Theorizing Class]; Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2509 (1993). For an example of explicit stereotyping against an African American female employee performing her identity contrary to her
supervisor’s norms, see Bryant v. Begin Manage Company, 281 F. Supp. 2d 561 (2003).
15.
See infra notes 70-73, 169-174, 262. See Abrams, supra note 14, at 2495; Kotkin, supra
note 3, at 1474.
16.
Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991
DUKE L.J. 365, 387 (1991).
17.
Id.; Yuracko, supra note 1, at 33. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 14, at 2529, 2537
(where a plaintiff in a sexual assault case was described as “loud, assertive, and abrasive” by the
court).
18.
Caldwell, supra note 16, at 387, 394 n.96. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 33.

6

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 20:1

her behavior triggers stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists, disloyal, foreign,
and suspect.19 Such stigmatization may occur notwithstanding that these
very traits are necessary for effective performance of the job and would be
viewed as strengths if exhibited by male white employees.
For workplace anti-discrimination laws to eradicate these multiple
binds that disparately impact women of color,20 this Article argues that
Title VII jurisprudence should take into account intergroup discrimination based on intragroup identity performance to assure all employees
within protected classes, not just a subset, are covered by workplace antidiscrimination law.21 I draw on Kenji Yoshino’s work on identity performance in the workplace that theorizes prejudice coping mechanisms by
members of low valued groups.22 Yoshino identifies three ways minorities
attempt to avoid the costs of their devalued group membership and attain
the benefits of the socially dominant group: converting, passing, and
covering.23
I also incorporate Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati’s scholarship that
examines the great lengths to which minorities go to efface their Black,
Latina, Asian or other low value traits and behaviors in order to reassure
colleagues and supervisors that they are not dangerous, loud, immoral,
lazy, or possess few interests in common with the majority-race crowd.24
The minority female employee thus does double duty—she must complete
her work as well as expend significant energy communicating to her coworkers that she is just like them.
Coercive assimilationism exacts a disproportionately high toll on
members of non-dominant social groups25 as facially neutral rules mask a
19.
See, e.g., Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787 JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (involving employees placing red, white, and blue ribbons outside of
every employee’s office door as a symbol of unity and patriotism and not placing a ribbon on
Egyptian Muslim woman employee’s door); Trina Grillo & Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the
Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other
–Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 404 (1991); Caldwell, supra note 16, at 365, 387.
20.
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also Greene, Title
VII, supra note 10, at 1370 (describing a workplace policy prohibiting employees from wearing
all-braided hairstyles); Reva Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 79 (2000); Caldwell,
supra note 16, at 394-95.
21.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (to prevail
on a claim for discrimination under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, Maynard must
show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside his protected
class or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected class).
22.
Yoshino, supra note 13, at 772-73; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 118-19.
23.
Yoshino, supra note 13, at 773.
24.
See generally Devon Carbado & Gitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1262, 1279 (2013) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity].
25.
AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 25 (2001); Yuracko, supra note 1, at 42; Rich, supra note 5, at 1170.

FALL 2014]

Coercive Assimilationism

7

bias towards the needs, interests, and inherited circumstances of the dominant group.26 Minority employees find themselves expected to behave,
talk, and dress in ways that emulate the dominant group, or at the very
least do not threaten their power to define professional norms.27 By the
same token, subjective aesthetic values determine who and what is valued
and entitled to control the workplace, and by extension the distribution of
wealth.28 Racial or ethnic minorities who engage in cultural displays and
exhibit behaviors disfavored or out of sync with the dominant white, Protestant, heterosexual male culture find themselves deemed unprofessional or
incompetent, resulting in their exclusion or marginalization in the workplace.29 While members of the dominant group are able to live and work
with minimal pressure to compromise their cultural values and norms,
those deemed outsiders are coerced to relinquish or at the very least hide
their foreign languages, clothing, cultural practices, hairstyles, and associations with other outsiders to obtain gainful employment.30
26.
SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 25; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 107 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Conversations at
Work] (explaining that “the employee uses her speaking opportunities to ‘signal’ that she has
certain characteristics that the employer values. The employer, in turn, ‘screens’ the employee’s
statements in order to evaluate whether the employee in fact has those characteristics.”); Krieger
& Fiske, supra note 6, at 1013.
27.
Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality As “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 303-04 (2005). Since 9/11, the
cases of Muslim women not hired or terminated because they wore a headscarf on grounds of
violating a dress policy has noticeably increased. Due to religious accommodation doctrines
favoring employees, many of these women have won their religious accommodation claims in
stark contrast to disparate treatment claims based on race or ethnicity. Elwakin v. Target Media
Partners Operating Co., No. 11-2648, 2012, WL 669068, (E.D. La. Feb. 29, 2012); EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Okla. 2011); EEOC v. White Lodging
Servs. Corp., No. 3:06CV-353-S 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32492 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2010);
Mowafy v. Noramco of Del., 620 F. Supp. 2d 603 (D. Del. 2009); EEOC v. Alamo Rent-ACar LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787
JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *2; Tyson v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-1888-DFHTAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13973 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2004).
28.

Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 370; Rich, supra note 5, at 1157.

29.
See e.g., Mirza v. Neiman Marcus Group, No. 06-cv-6484, 2009 WL 3824711, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2009) (order denying motion for summary judgment) (Muslim woman of
Pakistani descent alleged preferential treatment to non-Muslim, Caucasian employees, inferior
work assignments, and excluded from company holiday parties); Roberts & Roberts, supra note
10, at 370; Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1357-58 (2008).
30.
Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Skilled Healthcare
Group, Inc. to Pay Up to $450,000 for National Origin Discrimination (April 4, 2009) available
at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-14-09.cfm) (describing a case of Spanish speakers
prohibited from speaking Spanish in the workplace); Press Release, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, ADC Welcomes Jury Award for Muslim Woman (June 4, 2007) available at http://www.adc.org/index.php?id3117&no_cache=1&sword_list[ ]=hijab) (where a
woman was fired for refusing to remove her hijab); Hamillah Abdullah, Army’s ban on dreadlocks,
other styles seen as offensive to some African-Americans, CNN, Apr. 11, 2014, available at http://
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The effect is what Laura Roberts and Daryl Roberts call “cultural
profiling” where people who fail to show that they fit into a company’s
culture are not invited to join or are purged if they later exhibit nonassimilationist identities.31 Behaviors or traits that remind the employer of
the employee’s low social status and potential to thwart cultural hegemony
in the workplace result in adverse employment actions.32 In contrast,
members of minority groups who perform their identities in accordance
with coercive assimilationist demands receive better treatment than members in the same group who fail to do so.33 As a result, members of low
status groups must exert more energy than members of high status groups
to assuage their employers that they are not a threat to the organization’s
culture.34 The heightened sense of self-consciousness regarding all aspects
of their cultural and status displays imposes psychological stress and health
costs on minority employees that go unnoticed by employers and courts.35
While the anti-discrimination literature is replete with articles on African Americans, African American women, and LGBT communities,36
little is written on Muslim women of color. Accordingly, this Article
makes a scholarly intervention by examining the complexities of Muslim
www.cnn.com/2014/04/08/politics/army-hairstyle-ban-debate/ (African American women’s
hairstyles being banned).
31.
Roberts & Roberts, note 10 at 369; Green, supra note 10, at 627. See Abercrombie, 798
F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272-78 (recognizing that Abercrombie did not hire a Muslim teenager who
applied for a job at the store in Woodland Hills Mall in 2008 because, as a Muslim, she wears a
head scarf and the Abercrombie “Look Policy” prohibits sales models from wearing head wear);
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 370.
32.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 392; see also Shih, supra note 8, at 106 (noting
employers’ definition of a “good work ethic” as a willingness to work at any job regardless of
working conditions and to obey the orders and authority of employers); Rich, supra note 5, at
1142; Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1355.
33.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 388.
34.
Id. at 381; Claude Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity
and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 617 (1997).
35.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 399; Mayida Zaal, Tahani Salah & Michelle
Fine, The Weight of the Hyphen: Freedom, Fusion and Responsibility Embodied by Young MuslimAmerican Women During a Time of Surveillance, 11 APPLIED DEV. SCI., 164, 171 (2007).
36.
E.g., KATIE R. EYER, PROTECTING LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
(LGBT) WORKERS 13-16 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441282 (discussing the
ways that common law claims have been utilized to protect the rights of LGBT victims of harassment and discrimination); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1467 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado, Black Rights]; Matthew Clark, Stating a Title VII
Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available After Rene
v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313 (2003); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989);
Mary Elizabeth Powell, The Claims of Women of Color Under Title VII: The Interaction of Race and
Gender, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413 (1996). See generally Henry L. Chambers, Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557 (2001); William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res
Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447
(2013).
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women’s experiences through the lens of identity performance theory.
Part I lays out the theoretical underpinnings of anti-discrimination law and
social psychology including the scholarly debates between assimilationism
and multiculturalism, intersectionality theory, social identity formation,
stereotyping theory, and essentialism. Although rarely discussed in court
opinions, social psychology theories illuminate the gravity of the harms
caused by assimilationist pressures on low status groups to perform their
identities to the liking of high status groups.37
Part II applies social psychology and anti-discrimination theories to
the case of Muslim women of color in the workplace, an under-researched
area in legal scholarship.38 In doing so, I examine the identity performance
challenges and contradictions faced by Muslim women of color as “intersectionals” facing stereotypes against (1) Muslims as terrorists, violent, and
disloyal;39 (2) Muslim women as meek, oppressed, and lacking individual
agency;40 (3) women as sexualized,41 terminally second best to men, and
uncommitted to their careers;42 (4) immigrants as forever foreign and un37.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 999-1000 (arguing for courts to incorporate social
psychology into antidiscrimination doctrine to ensure antidiscrimination laws are keeping up
with the changing forms of bias from explicit to implicit in the United States); BANAJI &
GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 158-59; Nyla Branscombe, Richard Harvey & Michael Schmitt,
Perceiving Pervasive Discrimination Among African Americans: Implications for Group Identification and
Well-Being, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 135 (1999).
38.
Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 326 (2005); Janet K. Swim,
Laurie L. Cohen & Lauri L. Hyers, Experiencing Everyday Prejudice and Discrimination, in
PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 38, 38 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998).
See generally George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness,
2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1997).
39.
See Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, Muslim Americans: Faith, Freedom, and the Future, GAL7 (Aug. 2011), http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153611/REPORT-MuslimAmericans-Faith-Freedom-Future.aspx (“Americans of other major faiths are split on whether
or not it is possible to profile a terrorist on the basis of traits such as gender, age, or ethnicity.
Forty-nine percent of Jews, 46% of Catholics, and 44% of Protestants in the U.S. do not think
profiling is possible.”); see also Zogby International, American Views on Arab and Muslim Americans,
ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE 6-7 (Sept. 2010), http://www.aaiusa.org/reports/american-viewson-arab-and-muslim-americans-2010 (46% of Americans believe that Islam teaches hate, 47%
disagree that Islam is a religion of peace, and only 52% of Americans disagree that Muslims tend
to be religious fanatics); Wolfgang Wagner et al., The Veil and Muslim Women’s Identity: Cultural
Pressures and Resistance to Stereotyping, 18 CULTURE & PSYCHOL. 521, 533-34 (2012).
LUP

40.
Nadine Naber, ARAB AMERICA GENDER, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND ACTIVISM 170
(ed. Matthew Jacobson, Werner Sollors, New York University Press 2012); see Susan M. Akram
& Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 24 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 295, 309 (2003) (arguing that “Arab
women are often portrayed as weak, mute, covered in black, or as scarcely clad belly dancers”).
41.
LILA ABU-LUGHOD, DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING? 127 (2013); but see Wagner
et al., supra note 39, at 531 (2012); Naber, supra note 40, at 2-3.
42.
See, e.g., SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN, 98, 115, 161 (2013). Despite rises in women’s
educational attainments and entrance into the workforce, women still do the vast majority of
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deserving of equal treatment;43 and (5) ethnic minorities from the Middle
East and South Asia as barbaric, misogynist, and anti-American.44 I conclude that Muslim women of color are at risk of falling between the cracks
of Title VII jurisprudence due to courts’ unwillingness to recognize the
harms and the triple binds caused by coercive assimilationist pressures to
conform one’s identity to comport to high status group norms.
Part III highlights the triple bind in which many Muslim women of
color find themselves wherein they cannot simultaneously adhere to the
various identity demands. Facing the brunt of negative stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists, gender stereotypes of Muslim women as weak and oppressed, and stereotypes specific to her race or ethnicity, a Muslim female
employee is caught in a triple bind.45 If she assertively expresses her independent views, demonstrates ambition for promotion, and dresses in Western attire; her coworkers will admire her for defying the stereotype of the
meek, oppressed Muslim woman. At the same time that she is admired for
defying the purported yokes of Arab cultural oppression, she is penalized
for violating American gender norms that deem ambition and assertiveness
a liability for women.46 She may also trigger fears of Muslims as disloyal
terrorists in waiting. But any attempts to exercise deference to allay suspicions of her loyalty reinforce stereotypes of her submissiveness and inability
to lead.47 Thus, she pays a high price regardless how she chooses to perform her identity.
Part IV offers a new doctrinal proposal that addresses intergroup discrimination based on intragroup differences in identity performance.
Building off of Melissa Hart and Paul Secunda’s work on social framework
evidence in employment discrimination,48 I argue that courts should incorporate social psychology theories to recognize the invidious impact of
child care. As a result, “forty-three percent of highly qualified women with children are leaving
careers, or ‘off-ramping,’ for a period of time.”
43.
See Akram & Johnson, supra note 40, at 316 (providing examples of undesirability of
Arab immigrants, like an “INS-created strategy called ‘Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan,’ which called for mass arrests and detentions of noncitizens from Arab nations and
Iran and suggested using ideological exclusion grounds in the immigration laws to remove
noncitizens from Arab countries and Iran already in the United States”); Naber, supra note 40, at
196.
44.
Read & Bartkowski, supra note 1, at 396-97; Wagner et al., supra note 39, at 533-34;
Naber, supra note 40, at 92.
45.
See generally Yaser Ali, Sharia and Citizenship – How Islamophobia is Creating a SecondClass Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1037, 1041 (2012) (describing common
stereotypes of Muslims, including the stereotype of women as “weak and oppressed objects” and
the “Arab terrorist stereotype”).
46.
See SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 18; see Eugene Borgida, Corrie Hunt & Anita Kim,
On the Use of Gender Stereotyping Research in Sex Discrimination Litigation, 13 J.L. & Pol’y, 613,
620-21 (2005).
47.
Read & Bartkowski, supra note 1, at 396.
48.
See Melissa Hart and Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence
in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009). See also John
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negative stereotypes in employers’ purportedly objective employment decisions. Following the sex-stereotyping jurisprudence established in Price
Waterhouse Cooper v. Hopkins,49 judges should take seriously plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence that stereotypes against race, religion, and gender
motivated the employer’s action. While Title VII jurisprudence acknowledges the harms caused by explicit stereotyping in intergroup dynamics, it
has yet to meaningfully incorporate implicit stereotyping that discriminates
based on intragroup differences.50 As such, this Article calls on courts to
recognize the interaction between identity performance, assimilationist demands, negative stereotyping and discrimination at the intersection of race,
religion, and gender.
I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW AND POLICY
Each society experiences social stratification based on the norms, values, and culture of the socially dominant group.51 Currently in the United
States, the socially dominant group is white, Protestant Christian, heterosexual, and male.52 The privileges of membership in the dominant social
group are many. Institutional rules put in place by its members allocate
resources that secure their status at the top of the social hierarchy.53 The
Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The
Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1718 (2008).
49.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989) (concluding that in a Title
VII case, if a plaintiff proves gender played a role in the employment decision, “the defendant
may avoid a finding of liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account”).
50.
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 63 (1991); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1036 (2006); Grillo & Wildman, supra note
19, at 401.
51.
Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and Multiculturalism: The Policy of Racial/
ethnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Grillo & Wildman, supra note
19, 408; Naber, supra note 40, at 85.
52.
Kenneth M. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before
Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); Anthony P. Farley, Perfecting Slavery, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225,
244 (2004); Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 373; Abrams, supra note 14, at 2505; Greene,
Title VII, supra note 10, at 1389. See generally Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 570 (2008)
(naming white Americans as the socially dominant group).
53.
Scholars have noted that many people who belong to the dominant group “do not see
the ways in which they are privileged, and so well-intentioned middle class, white liberals often
strive to maintain privilege for their children, while denying they are doing so.” Avtar Brahi &
Ann Phoenix, Ain’t I a Woman? Revisiting Intersectionality, 5 J. INT’L WOMEN STUD. 75, 80-81
(2004); BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 143-44 (noting how many “benefits of being in
the in-group tend to remain invisible” because they arise from the person’s family, church,
school, neighborhood, and access to various institutions); Abrams, supra note 14, at 2524-25
(analogizing treatment of women in the workplace through sexual harassment claims to middle
class white liberal maintenance of privilege).
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socially dominant group defines the values, behaviors, and other characteristics that constitute what is “normal,” “competent,” “good,” and “professional.”54 Others must then assimilate in order to have the opportunity to
attain economic, social, and political privileges. Those unable or unwilling
to do so pay a high price ranging from under or unemployment, inaccessibility to education, poor quality housing, intergenerational poverty, and
targeted enforcement of criminal laws.55 Coercive assimilationism, therefore, imposes dignitary and psychological harms that warrant legal redress.
As the US economy becomes increasingly corporatized, the
predominantly white Christian male managers who manage them set dress
and behavioral standards that affect millions of American workers.56 Seemingly neutral practices ostensibly aimed at increasing productivity effectively single out members of historically disadvantaged, marginalized, and
underrepresented groups.57 For example, workplace rules that bar Black
women from wearing corn rows in their hair, Black men from having
dreadlocks, or Latinos from speaking Spanish during work breaks merely
reinforce the dominant culture and exclude non-conformists.58 When
these practices are challenged in court, judges often defer to corporations’
subjective definitions of professionalism, even if clearly disadvantageous to
racial minorities.59 The courts deem cultural practices as unprotected voluntary choices distinct from protected immutable morphological
characteristics.60
Although organizational culture is framed under capitalist, profitmaximizing objectives for maintaining a productive and cohesive workplace, the underlying values and norms that define the workplace culture
54.
See Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1363; see, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 1, at 19, 44
(discussing performing race and gender in keeping with socially dominant norms).
55.
Naber, supra note 40, at 72. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW (2012) (examining systemic discrimination against Blacks in the criminal justice system).
56.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 17. Minorities account for the following percentage of
CEOs in Fortune 500 companies: African-Americans: 1.2%; Asian: 1.6%; Latino: 1.6%; Women:
4.4%. white males account for over 90% of CEOs in the Fortune 500 companies. See DIVERSITYINC, Where is Diversity in Fortune 500 CEOs?, DIVERSITYINC (Feb. 1, 2014) http://
www.diversityinc.com/diversity-facts/wheres-the-diversity-in-fortune-500-ceos/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2014). See also Chris Isidore, Black CEOs are Still Rare, CNN MONEY (Mar. 22, 2012,
6:47 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/22/news/companies/black-ceo/.
57.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 371. Other stigmatized groups included Turkish,
Japanese, Chinese, and Hindu. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 173. See also Green, supra
note 10, at 662 (noting that judges shortsightedly view particular work cultures as natural and
just without inquiring into the underlying social norms that disadvantage minorities and
women).
58.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 400; see also Bandsuch, supra note 11, at 287;
Green, supra note 10, at 648; Steele, supra note 34, at 614.
59.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 3, 18; Green, supra note 10, at 628; Caldwell, supra note 16,
at 371.
60.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 5-6; Rich, supra note 5, at 1137-38; Caldwell, supra note 16,
at 378.
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may stem from the socially dominant group’s norms and preferences as
opposed to objective criteria tied to productivity.61 Indeed, it is questionable whether assimilation is in fact necessary to create a productive and
cohesive workplace. In a culturally diverse American society, workplace
rules based on cultural assimilationsim may instead compromise the very
cohesion and productivity they purport to promote by privileging some
groups over others.62 Indeed, assimilationist policies send a message to minority employees that their cultural displays, values, and behaviors are inferior, resulting in stigmatization.63 And as long as the psychological cost
of such stigmatization is imposed on low status out-groups, employers are
unlikely to voluntarily change their work cultures. Thus, Title VII becomes all the more important as a mechanism for countering the harmful
effects of coercive assimilationist practices, and instead, supporting a multiculturalist model.64
A. Coercive Assimilationism and Multiculturalism
Multiculturalists argue that colorblind policies are merely rationalizations for ignoring illegitimate racial hierarchies and racial bias.65 Richard
Delgado and Kevin Johnson, among other legal scholars, challenge “blindness to differences” policies and call for a multicultural citizenship model.66
61.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 397; Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity
in the Workplace, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2006) (discussing how pressures to suppress
linguistic differences cause resentment and anxiety); Abrams, supra note 14, at 2533.
62.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 369; Rodriguez, supra note 61, at 1694 (discussing how pressures to suppress linguistic differences cause resentment and anxiety); Rich, supra
note 5, at 1144; Green, supra note 10, at 668 (citing reasons why diversity minimizes separatism
and balkanization within American society and workplaces).
63.
Greene, supra note 10, at 628 (arguing that “behavioral expectations along a white,
male norm imposes extra performance costs on outsiders and forces reconstruction of identity”).
See Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1356 (arguing for a broader definition of race that shifts
the focus from the employer’s intent to discriminates to the effects of the employment decision
including the perpetuation of racial stigmatization); see Mirza v. Neiman Marcus Group, No. 06cv-6484, 2009 WL 3824711, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2009) (alleging employer’s discriminatory treatment causes plaintiff anxiety and depression for which she took Prozac).
64.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 40. But see Yoshino, supra note 13, at 876-77 (arguing that
U.S. constitutional and statutory law’s fail to address compulsory assimilation due to the “assimilation bias” of anti-discrimination law that emphasizes immutability as a prerequisite for
protection).
65.
Ford, supra note 4, at 1807; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 205-06 (discussing studies where individuals self-describe themselves as color-blind but their actions show otherwise); Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12 (2013). See
also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly is Racial Diversity, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1149,
1157-58 (2002) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, What Exactly] (reviewing ANDREA GUERRERO,
SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2002)) (explaining
that racial diversity promotes colorblindness by rendering the racial identities of non-white students less salient).
66.
SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 22; Ford, supra note 4, at 1803-04. Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy
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They argue that a nuanced understanding of citizenship acknowledges, respects, and even nourishes group-based distinctiveness based on a belief
that these cultures are intrinsically good and valuable.67 Accordingly, incorporating identity performance into anti-discrimination jurisprudence is
an integral part of the state’s commitment to diversity.68
While multiculturalism may alleviate the harms imposed by coercive
assimiliationism, it is certainly not flawless. Inherent in protecting a particular culture and its adherents is defining the values, practices, and norms
that distinguish that culture. In turn, mainstream society may take certain
definitions as truth notwithstanding diversity within a culture.69 As aptly
noted by Richard Ford, should descriptions of identity become codified
into law, then normative injunctions about how group members ought to
act may strip individuals of the autonomy to shape their own identity
within a particular social group.70 Paradoxically, legally protecting cultural
practices and behaviors of protected classes may in effect deny agency to
members of low status groups. Courts’ rulings would thus legitimize one
version of a group identity above all others while reinforcing the notion
that groups possesses a defined essence.71
These risks have a particularly acute effect on women. Privileged
male members within the cultural group are often the gatekeepers for defining the group’s culture.72 Their status grants them greater authority to
impose patriarchal visions of the community, thereby subordinating female
and other underprivileged members.73 Intragroup hierarchies become reinforced to alleviate intergroup hierarchies.74 As a result, feminist and progressive positions within the community that challenge existing power
structures find themselves marginalized and silenced.75 Moreover, the implicit deference to cultural autonomy within a multiculturalism model reSystemic Social Ills, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1282-83 (1992); Akram & Johnson, supra note
40, at 309 (2003).
67.

SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 22; Ford, supra note 4, at 1807.

68.
See SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 22; see also Siegel, supra note 20, at 82 (describing
“anti discrimination law as a social practice that regulates the social practices of race and
gender.”).
69.
Roberto J. Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2210 (2003).
70.

Id.; Ford, supra note 4, at 180.

71.

Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 394.

72.

See, e.g., EEOC, GLASS CEILINGS: THE STATUS OF WOMEN AS OFFICIALS AND
MANAGERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/index.html [hereinafter EEOC Report] (asserting that even though women represent 48 percent
of all employment, they represent only 36.4 percent of officials and managers).
73.

SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 4.

74.
SHAHNAZ KHAN, MUSLIM WOMEN: CRAFTING A NORTH AMERICAN IDENTITY 1113 (University Press of Florida, 2000).
75.

Id. at xiv.
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lieves mainstream society of its responsibility for subordinating certain
members of minority groups.76
In the end, the subordinated members of low status groups, often
women, become the biggest losers in a multiculturalist model unless institutions equip them to dismantle the power hierarchies within their ethnic
communities and broader mainstream society that subordinates them in the
first place.77
B. Social Identity Formation and Stigmatization
Debates on multiculturalism versus assimilationism implicate individual social identity formation because every individual has a social identity
that she constructs in relation to others.78 As members of particular social
groups, we see ourselves as sharing specific attributes and concerns with
those who share our social identity. Social identity is not static, but exists
within a continuous process of negotiation and renegotiation such that social identification is a dynamic process.79 The attributes, behaviors, and
meanings of an identity group are socially defined both by society at large
and the experiences of the in-group with whom a person identifies.80 The
meanings associated with a particular social category, therefore, may
change as well as the importance attached to an identity by a particular
individual.81
The importance of a particular group to an individual’s identity is a
significant determinant in how an individual perceives and copes with a
discriminatory event.82 Social identity theory posits that targets of
prejudice are not viewed simply as individuals but rather as representatives
of a group of like people possessing innate, biological traits.83 Stereotypes
of particular identity groups are based on assumptions held by outsiders of
which the consequences are exclusionary and detrimental to the target
76.

Id. at 13.

77.

See, e.g., at 15; SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 3, 6.

78.
See generally, Kay Deaux & Kathleen A. Ethier, Negotiating Social Identity, in
PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 301, 301-323 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds.,
1998).
79.

Id. at 305.

80.

Id. at 303.

81.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 53; KHAN, supra note 74, at xi (discrimination based on intragroup differences that do not confirm intergroup stereotypes impose false
dichotomies on otherwise complex and highly diversified identities).
82.
Nyla Branscombe & Naomi Ellemers, Coping with Group-Based Discrimination: Individualistic Versus Group-Level Strategies, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE, 243, 252 (Janet
K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998) [hereinafter Branscombe & Ellemers].
83.
Jean Phinney, Cindy Cantu, Dawn Kurtz, Ethnic and American Identity as Predictors of
Self-Esteem Among African American, Latino, and White Adolescents, 26 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE, 165, 166 (1996).
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group.84 Stigmatized individuals possess some attribute or characteristic
that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular setting.85 Determinations regarding which cultural values are devalued or which groups
are stigmatized are subjective rather than objective realities.86
In the case of African Americans, for example, studies show that they
encounter a set of circumstances and experiences that represent their differential treatment from European Americans.87 Prejudice is manifested in
various ways, including, but not limited, to verbal rejection, avoidance,
discrimination, and physical attack.88 In the workplace, members of stigmatized groups experience limitations in access to opportunities and resources as a result of what social psychologists call insidious trauma:
chronic events linked to the social structure and institutionalized and ubiquitous forms of oppression experienced in daily life.89
The chronic experiences of prejudice produce greater general stress
due in part to the cognitive appraisals of threat by the victim towards the
antagonist and normative developmental events specifically linked to membership in an oppressed group.90 Some targets of negative stereotyping
who recognize others’ negative views of their group membership internalize the negative evaluations and develop lower self-esteem.91 Members of
oppressed groups suffer tangible costs in terms of direct effects on life out84.
Deaux & Ethier, supra note 78, at 301-02; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at
78-79; see, e.g., Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 170 (describing a young Muslim woman’s
frustration with being treated as an outsider when she identified herself as an American).
85.

Steele, supra note 34, at 623. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 66, at 1282-83.

86.

Deaux & Ethier, supra note 78, at 303.

87.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 251. Deaux & Ethier, supra note 78, at 303,
306; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 47, 209 (reporting that 75% of those who take the
Race IAT on the internet or in laboratory studies reveal an automatic white preference).
88.

Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 250.

89.
Id. Notably, courts fail to recognize as adverse employment actions verbal abuse, insults, unfair criticism, or excessive scrutiny notwithstanding the stigmatizing effects of such treatment. See, e.g., Smalls v. Allstate Ins. Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bennett
v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (finding for the discriminated employee but stating that even
though Title VII is violated when “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” the behavior has to be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment”). Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441
(2013) (“In such cases, we have held, the plaintiff must show that the work environment was so
pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment were altered.”)
90.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 247, 258 (defining stress as an environmental demand linked to major life changes or stressors as well as daily hassles and chronic strains,
with a range of physical and psychiatric distress).
91.
Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, supra note 37, at 146; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra
note 4, at 93. But see Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 248 (other members of stigmatized groups respond to criticism by refusing to attribute their poor outcomes to personal inadequacies rather than group-based discrimination as a means of preserving self-esteem and retain
feelings of self-control).

FALL 2014]

Coercive Assimilationism

17

comes such as “rates and experiences of unemployment and underemployment, income level and social status, infant mortality, physical health and
injury, emotional distress, and psychopathology.”92 This is consistent with
studies finding that the more women or African Americans perceive themselves as victims of gender or racial discrimination; the more they exhibit
adverse psychiatric and physical health symptoms including higher levels of
depression.93 Prejudices from the dominant out-group that view a woman
as the “other” trigger feelings of helplessness, resentfulness, and anger.94
As a result, people identified as members of a stigmatized group, including Muslim women of color, find themselves facing a social world that
is in part hostile. Various forms of subtle and blatant prejudice infiltrates
the lives of low status group members, making prejudice an ongoing lived
experience within everyday life.95 In response, stigmatized individuals
adopt different strategies to cope with perceived discrimination depending
on the magnitude of the threat and the individual’s level of identification
with a disadvantaged group.96 The high identifiers with the disadvantaged
group employ group-based strategies while low identifiers employ individual mobility strategies.97
Persons who self-categorize at the individual level, as opposed to the
group level, respond to negative stereotypes about their social identity
group by attempting to set themselves apart from fellow in-group members. This is known as identity negation.98 Identity negation can take three
forms: (1) eliminating an identity altogether, known as “conversion” in
identity performance theory; (2) identity denial known as “passing” in
identity performance theory; and (3) lowered identification known as
“covering” in identity performance theory.99 Ultimately, identity per92.
Kevin W. Allison, Stress and Oppressed Social Category Membership, in PREJUDICE: THE
TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 145, 145 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998).
93.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 247. Combined with the greater life stress
caused by fewer economic resources, lower income racial minorities suffer more general stress
than their counterpart European American. Allison, supra note 92, at 153. Similarly, Muslims
who perceive greater discrimination experience lower levels of self-esteem. Azadeh Ghaffari,
Ayse Ciftci, Religiosity and Self-Esteem of Muslim Immigrants to the United States: The Moderating
Role of Perceived Discrimination, 20 INT’L J. FOR PSYCHOL. OF RELIGION 14, 20 (2010).
94.
Allison, supra note 92, at 159-60. See KHAN, supra note 74, at 45 (providing an example of a Muslim woman who did not succeed in passing, thereby leaving her lonely and depressed because she was excluded both from the Muslim community and mainstream society).
95.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 37-38 (citing short term interactions such as
street remarks and glares, long discussions, and prejudice that targets the individual or the entire
social group based on negative stereotypes).
96.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 243.
97.
Three identity management strategies are employed by disadvantaged social groups to
maintain a positive social or personal identity in the face of negative stereotypes: individual mobility, social competition, and social creativity. Id. at 245.
98.
Id. at 246; Deaux & Ethier, supra note 78, at 307-08.
99.
Deaux & Ethier, supra note 78, at 307-08; Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J.
769, 772 (2002). See Part II for a detailed explication of identity performance theory.
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formance strategies are coping mechanisms in response to negative
stereotypes.
C. Essentialism and Stereotyping Theory
Negative stereotyping of low status groups perpetuates prejudice and
discriminatory acts.100 Stereotyping assumes individuals within a particular
low status group possess the same qualities and characteristics by virtue of
their common social group membership.101 Negative stereotypes arise
from negative associations of certain traits that reinforce notions that individuals and groups possessing such traits are intellectually, morally, and
culturally inferior to members of the dominant group.102 The misdeeds of
one group member are attributed to other members, denying low status
groups the individual agency afforded to the high status group. Yet, when a
member of a low status group achieves success, she is often treated as an
exception to the stereotype rather than evidence of the fallacy of the
stereotype.103
Each low status group is burdened with different negative stereotypes
depending on a nation’s historical, political, and social circumstances. African Americans, for example, are often stereotyped as undisciplined, insubordinate, and unwilling to assimilate into America’s purported
“melting pot” society.104 Some stereotypes are gendered. Black males, for
example, are presumed irresponsible, violent, sexual predators, drug dealers, and prone to criminality.105 Black women are stereotyped as sexually
insatiable, promiscuous, immoral, aggressive, and tough.106 When a Black
woman is viewed as independent, tough, assertive, or a matriarch, these are
negative attributes that place her outside of socially acceptable womanhood
100.
Zoë Richards & Miles Hewstone, Subtyping and Subgrouping: Processes for the Prevention
and Promotion of Stereotype Change, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 52, 52 (2001) (defining stereotypes as “a type of schema or knowledge structure about social groups”).
101.
Thus, “members of an out-group [are] seen as less diverse and more stereotypic than
members” of the in-group, also known as the “out-group homogeneity effect.” Id. at 52; see also
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 128-129; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1034.
102.
Caldwell, supra note 16, at 387; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 66, at 1282-83 (1992)
(describing various negative stereotypes against African Americans, Mexicans, Asians, and Native
Americans).
103.
Richards & Hewstone, supra note 100, at 53; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 66, at
1287; but see Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems
of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 891 (1995) (stating that “achievements by
members of the privileged group are viewed as meritorious and the result of individual effort,
rather than as privileged.”).
104.
Caldwell, supra note 16, at 392-93 (citing ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF AMERICAN MIND 91 (1989)); Green, supra note 10, at 646 (describing an example of an African American woman scientist who was not promoted because her racially salient African dress, hair, and
behavior was too different from the researchers she would supervise).
105.
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 102 (2013).
106.
Abrams, supra note 14, at 2529 (citation omitted).
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and labels her a “bad employee” in stark contrast to a white male who is
praised for possessing similar traits.107
In the case of Muslims, religious essentialism falsely assumes a monolithic “Muslim Experience,” or “Muslim Women Experience” that imposes immutable characteristics upon all Muslims such that the essentialist
is relieved of the effort to learn about the lives of individuals with all of the
discomforts that it entails.108 Like Blacks, stereotypes against Muslims are
gendered wherein Muslim males are stereotyped as terrorists, disloyal, suspect, barbaric, and violent.109 Muslim women are often stereotyped as
meek, oppressed by their male relatives, discouraged by their families from
pursuing their professional aspirations, pressured to be housewives, and
granted less educational opportunities than their male siblings.110 After the
September 11th terrorist attacks, Muslim women found they were doubly
burdened with gendered religious stereotypes as well as “raced” religious
stereotypes where their Muslim headscarves equated them with terrorists
and violence against Americans.111 As a result, Muslims across the nation
107.
Caldwell, supra note 16, at 395. See Irene Browne & Joya Misra, The Intersection of
Gender and Race in the Labor Market, 29 ANN. REV. OF SOC’Y 487, 490 (2003) (explaining that
“stereotypes of Black women have included the asexualized Mammy, the promiscuous Jezebel,
and the profligate welfare queen. These images reinforce racial divisions by denigrating Black
women in comparison with White women.”). See also Adrien Katherine Wing & Laura
Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis,
3 J. OF GENDER RACE & JUST. 257, 259 (1999) (“Black mothers are considered the epitome of
bad mothers. They are viewed as being unmarried, lazy, promiscuous, welfare queens—the opposite of the ideal mother”) (footnote omitted).
108.
ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 70-71 (“there is no ‘Muslim woman’ and no IslamLand. The situations of individuals, regions, countries, and classes differ”). See also Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter
Harris, Race and Essentialism]; D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear
in the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 FLA. INT’L. U. L. REV. 333, 355 (2013) [hereinafter
Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis] (explaining that because of their religious beliefs “Muslim
women are marked as racial and gendered ‘others,’ as they do not represent the prevailing white,
female, Protestant normative standard of womanhood and they are deemed ‘radical’ or
‘militant’”).
109.
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 135 (discussing how an act of terrorism committed by a member of a foreign group leaves a more lasting stereotype than a similar act of
terrorism committed by a member of the in-group); Akram & Johnson, supra note 40, at 302.
110.
See, e.g., Tyson v. Methodist Health Grp., Inc., 2004 WL 1629538, at *7 (S.D. Ind.
June 17, 2004) (supervisor mocked Senegalese Muslim woman questioning why a married Muslim woman was still working implying that her religion required her to stay home to serve her
husband); ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 88 (noting the long history of gendered orientalism
wherein pictorial and literary depictions portray Muslim women as culturally distinct and mirror
opposites of Western women as downtrodden victims or sensually exotified). See also SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN ET AL., IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN (1999).
111.
Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim American Women in the Crosshair of Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 193 (2012); Ghaffari & Ciftci,
supra note 94, at 15; see also Neil Gotanda, In the Issue: Race, Religion, and Late Democracy: The
Racialization of Islam in American Law, 637 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 184, 186
(2011); see also Naber, supra note 40, at 252-53; see, e.g., Ara v. Tedeschi Food Shops, Inc., 794
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in schools, on the streets, on buses and metros, and at work found themselves the objects of intensified suspicion and surveillance.112
The psychological and physical health costs of stereotyping are significant. Stigmatization arising from negative stereotypes stifles motivation
and energy and diverts attention away from performance towards affective
and behavioral regulation.113 This translates into limited access to resources
and produces lower job performance and lower income.114 To cope, some
members of oppressed groups minimize their investment and personal
identification with specific domains of performance in which they are stereotyped as incompetent.115 For example, women and African Americans
are stereotyped as unable to succeed in math and engineering thereby discouraging many members of these low status groups from pursuing certain
careers.116 Moreover, when women and racial minorities have opportunities in workplaces with small representations of their in-group, they may
opt not to pursue them due to fears they will unlikely be accepted as
equals.117 By avoiding potential rejection, these women seek to spare
themselves the interpersonal stress associated with being a minority.118
They end up settling for an objectively less desirable job with less pay,
prestige, and growth opportunities.119
Despite temptations to attribute negative stereotyping to merely cognitive errors by well-intentioned actors, American history provides multiple examples of how stereotypes were used as a control device to justify
oppression, assuage whites’ guilt for slavery, and perpetuate economic
privileges along racial and gender lines.120 Though the most egregious
manifestations of such stereotypes are now condemned, their pernicious
influence remains, albeit in subtle forms. For example, Samuel Huntington
F. Supp. 2d 259, 261 (D. Mass. 2011) (involving a Muslim woman of Bangladeshi descent alleging her manager showed her a picture of Sadaam Hussein after he was killed and told her “your
leader is finished,” stated that Bangladesh was the number one terrorist country, and threw out
all job applications by applicants with Muslim sounding names).
112.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 164 (quoting Sunaina Maira, Youth Culture, Citizenship, and Globalization: South Asian Muslim Youth in the United States After September 11th, 24
COMP. STUD. OF S. ASIA, AFR., AND THE MIDDLE E. 219, 219 (2004)).
113.
See generally Allison, supra note 92, at 145-70; See Lorraine P. Sheridan, Islamophobia
Pre– and Post–September 11th, 2001, 21 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 317, 317-22 (2006)
(discussing a study documenting the rise of “Islamophobia” before and after September 11th).
114.
Id. at 163.
115.
Id. at 156.
116.
See id. at 156; see also BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 88-89; see also Steele,
supra note 34, at 615.
117.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 39-40; see Green, supra note 10, at 650, 660
(discussing the Sears case, in which a court accepted the argument that there were fewer women
working at Sears because of their own work preferences, not discrimination).
118.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 39-40.
119.
Id. at 41.
120.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 66, at 1287.
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and Lino Graglia argue that disparities in educational achievement, socioeconomic status, and professional success are attributable to particular cultures’ failure to value education and hard work.121 Similarly, others argue
that women are not senior executives in corporations and law firms because they are unwilling to make a commitment to their careers or simply
do not have the willpower and intellect to handle the stress.122 In the end,
stereotypes allow the public to shift the blame on targets of disparate outcomes rather than address the systemic societal inequities perpetuated by
the stereotypes.
Although all humans make use of stereotyping, social psychologists
have found that stereotyping is commonly practiced by people who perceive human groups as rigid, undifferentiated, and dichotomous.123 To
these essentialists, human attributes are biologically based rather than socially constructed, and thus stereotypes are justified as a reflection of innate
and inherent factors possessed by a particular group.124 Essentialists impose
cultural group responsibility such that a group’s culture causes inferior outcomes for a low status group.125
Studies by social psychologists Zoe Richards and Miles Hewstone
show that the more familiar a person is with a particular group, the more
variable the group is perceived.126 However, when some perceivers are
faced with disconfirming information that challenges their stereotype, they
tend to maintain the stereotype by grouping together disconfirming members into a subtype and treating them as an exception unrepresentative of
121.
Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2004 at 30,
44, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2495&print=1 ( warning that influx of immigrants may cause division of the United States into “two peoples, two
cultures and two languages”); Sonia Smith, UT Law Prof. Lino Gragalia Says Black and Hispanic
Students are Less “Academically Competent” Again, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 11, 2012, 11:41 PM
http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/ut-law-prof-lino-graglia-says-black-and-hispanic-students-are-less-%E2%80%9Cacademically-competent%E2%80%9D; Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas
Law Professor Prompts A Furor Over Race Comments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/09/16/us/texas-law-professor-prompts-a-furor-over-race-comments
.html.
122.

SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 92-94.

123.
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 91-92; see also Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild & Donald Ernst, Are Essentialist Beliefs Associated with Prejudice?, 41 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
87, 87 (2002) (explaining that one aspect of the prejudiced personality is a “rigid, dichotomous
and ambiguity-intolerant to cognitive style.”).
124.
Brock Bastian & Nick Haslam, Psychological Essentialism and Stereotype Endorsement, 42
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 228, 228 (2006); See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at
191.
125.
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4 at 191. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 121, at
37 (Mexican immigrants lag behind U.S. norms for percentages of high school degrees, percentages of post-high school degrees, rates of managerial positions, and rates of home ownership.).
126.

Richards & Hewstone, supra note 100, at 64.
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the group.127 In identity performance theory, this phenomenon is known
as racial exceptionalism wherein the majority points to a select number of
minorities they have hired to disprove allegations of unlawful bias.128
Often times those individuals possess the phenotype of their race or
ethnicity that may be the basis for forming the stereotype but perform
their identities in accordance with the demands of the majority group.
Thus, calls for increased interaction between different identity groups
should not be limited to intergroup interactions but also exposure to the
various intragroup differences that dispel homogenizing stereotypes.129
D. Intersectionality Theory
Any discussion of women of color and discrimination law entails examining how belonging to multiple low status groups further complicates
intergroup dynamics. The intersection of identities confounds the essentialist discriminator while also leading to uniquely tailored stereotypes of
Black women, Latina women, or Muslim women, among others.
Intersectionality theory interrogates the interplay between gender,
race, religion, and other categories of differences in individual lives, social
practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies.130 Rather
than examine prejudice and discrimination through binaries of solely race,
gender, or religion, intersectionality theorizes identity in a more complex
manner.131 It posits that legal theory and social policy that focuses on discrimination against individuals on the basis of protected traits as separate
and distinct from each other, rather than interactive with each other, fails
to uncover the gender components of racism, race components of sexism,
and the gender and race components of religious bias.132 As such, intersectionality affects outcomes of power, access to resources, and distribution of
wealth.133 Social and material realities of women of color’s lives are af127.
Id. at 56; GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20, 21, 23 (1979). In
contrast, subgrouping is a process that promotes stereotype change because it causes the perceiver
to organize information into multiple clusters of individuals who are similar to one another in
some way and different from other group members. Examples include career women, housewives, and feminist women within the larger stereotype of women. Richards & Hewstone, supra
note 100, at 61.
128.
Carbado & Gulati, What Exactly, supra note 65, at 1156 (explaining that racial exceptionalism may lead to racial conflict and alienation and that is does not necessarily produce
belonging).
129.

Rich, supra note 5, at 1268.

130.
Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67, 77 (2008);
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality Identity, Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241 (1991); Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note
108, at 585-90 (1990).
131.

Jennifer Nash, Re-thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1, 2 (2008).

132.

See Caldwell, supra note 18, at 374.

133.

Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 CHI. J. 1771, 1789-91 (2005).
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fected by how their race, class, and gender identities interact to produce
and transform power relations to the disadvantage of low status groups.134
Focusing on Black women’s experiences,135 Kimberlé Crenshaw and
Angela Harris argue that the distinct history of Black women and the negative stereotypes associated with them dictates a tailored analysis of discrimination that expounds on how their interactive low status identities
impact access to equal opportunity in the workplace.136 Absent recognition of the interaction of multiple identities, Black women are at risk of
being denied the same protections available to other individuals protected
by antidiscrimination law.137 Indeed, courts consistently fail to comprehend intersectionality. They incorrectly assume that racism and sexism operate independently such that a Black woman must show either that she
was discriminated against because she was a woman or because she was
Black rather than because she was a Black woman.138 An employer, therefore, may defeat the Black female plaintiff’s prima facie case by pointing to
other women or other Black males who were not subjected to the alleged
disparate treatment.139
134.
Intersectionality theory offers a theoretical tool to underscore the lived multidimensionality of marginalized subject’s experiences to combat feminist hierarchy, male or race hegemony, racial exclusivity. Jennifer Nash, Re-thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1, 2
(2008).
135.
Kimberlé Crenshaw, supra note 130, at 1241-42 (arguing that that many of the experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender
discrimination); see generally Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: on Teaching
Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151 (2010). See also Jennifer C. Nash,
“Home Truths” on Intersectionality, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 445 (2011).
136.
See Crenshaw, Close Encounters, supra note 135; see Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra
note 108; Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality
Theory in EEO Litigation 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 993 (2011) (providing an example of “an
employer [who] might hire both white women and black men but refuse to hire black women
because he stereotypes them as desperate single mothers[, and] since this stereotype is specific to
black women, it cannot be explained as the summed effects of racism and sexism.” (citation
omitted)); Browne & Misra, supra note 107, at 500 (“For instance, employers depict low-skill
young Black men from the inner city as lazy, belligerent, or dangerous (Kirschenman & Neckerman 1991, Moss & Tilly 2001), but they stereotype low-skill Black women as single mothers
who are either distracted or desperate for a paycheck”); Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality
and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 200 (2006).
137.
See Areheart, supra note 136, at 214 (asserting that a “double standard appears to exist,
whereby white male . . . litigants enjoy additional legal protections which do not extend to nonwhite male intersectional claimants.”).
138.
See Jennifer Nash, Re-thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1, 8-9 (2008) (critiquing the treatment of black women as unitary and monolithic such that “class and sexuality [ ]
are obscured in the service of presenting ‘black woman’ as a category that opposes both ‘whites’
and ‘black men’.”).
139.
See ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 40, at 132 (noting that a “discriminatory legal system
compounds the problems for women and girls” in a particular society); see, e.g., Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 12, at 714 (providing an example of a
Black woman in the workplace who deals with discrimination because “black women exist only
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I argue the same analysis applies to Muslim women of color with the
addition that they face a triple bind. They face stereotypes unique to Muslim women that depict them as oppressed, subjugated, unable to lead, and
in need of saving by American notions of gender equality. Muslim women
also find themselves discriminated against as women expected to be feminine, deferential to male authority, and attractive at work.140 And they are
stigmatized as suspect Muslims with covert terrorist agendas.141 Their intersectional identities destabilize notions of a universal woman, Muslim,
Arab, or other low status group by highlighting that multiple sites of oppression intersect to the terms and relations of power in society, including
in the workplace.142
The next section incorporates the fore-mentioned legal and social
psychology theories into an examination of how Muslim women of color,
an under-researched group, have performed their multiple identities in a
workplace infected by coercive assimiliationism. I proffer a nuanced explication of the contradictory identity performance pressures that leave many
of them unprotected by current Title VII jurisprudence—regardless
whether they reject or succumb to coercive assimilationism. For these reasons, Part IV offers doctrinal recommendations calling for more expansive
interpretations of Title VII to address these forms of latent discrimination.
II. PERFORMING IDENTITY AT WORK: THE CASE
MUSLIM WOMEN OF COLOR

OF

The antidiscrimination literature is replete with articles on African
Americans, African American women, and LGBT communities,143 but litto the extent that their experiences comport with the experiences of black men or white
women.”).
140.
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 530 (1982) (Contemporary industrial society’s version of a woman is “docile, soft, passive, nurturant, vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, childlike, incompetent, masochistic,
and domestic, made for child care, home care, and husband care. . .Women who resist or fail,
including those who never did fit—for example, black and lower-class women who cannot survive if they are soft and weak and incompetent, assertively self-respecting women, women with
ambitions of male dimensions—are considered less female, lesser women.”).
141.
KHAN, supra note 74, at 50; see, e.g., Ara v. Tedeschi Food Shops, Inc., 794 F. Supp.
2d 259, 261 (D. Mass. 2011) (involving a Muslim woman of Bangladeshi descent alleging her
manager showed her a picture of Sadaam Hussein after he was killed and told her “your leader is
finished,” stated that Bangladesh was the number one terrorist country, and threw out all job
applications by applicants with Muslim sounding names); ); Mowafy v. Noramco of Del., 620 F.
Supp. 2d 603, 607-08 (D. Del. 2009) (coworker asked Egyptian Muslim woman why Muslims
produce so many terrorists and screaming in fright upon observing her conducting her daily
prayers at work).
142.
Jennifer Nash, Re-thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1, 3 (2008).
143.
See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557,
563 (2001) (discussing sexual orientation in relation to employment discrimination); Katie R.
Eyer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Employees, in REPRESENTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDERED CLIENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 81, 99-102 (Pa. Bar. Inst. pub.
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tle is written on Muslim women of color. Accordingly, this Section expands the literature through an examination of the complexities of Muslim
women’s experiences through the lens of identity performance theory.
Section A describes the unique ways in which Muslim women adopt the
individual identity performance strategies of converting, passing, and covering. Section B turns to group level strategies wherein Muslim women
increase their identification with Muslim communities, also known as
identity enhancement or social competition group strategy, to maintain a
positive social identity and self-esteem in the face of prejudice. By expounding on individual and group level strategies, this Section offers a
nuanced perspective on how Muslim women’s identity performance pressures are both similar and different than those faced by other women of
color. As a result, Muslim women adopt coping strategies unique to their
cultural, religious, and racial circumstances all of which should be considered by courts presiding over employment cases involving intergroup discrimination against Muslim women based on intragroup difference.
A. Muslim Women’s Identity Performance Strategies
Social psychology scholars Branscombe and Ellemers find that when
presented with opportunities to gain membership in higher status group,
most people will attempt to negate their identities associated with the devalued group and pursue individual mobility strategies.144 Such findings
corroborate racial hierarchy theory in critical race studies wherein members of stigmatized races may discriminate against other stigmatized races as
a means of increasing their association with the dominant white race.145
Along those lines, identity negation entails a willingness to make significant changes to one’s self-definition in order to decrease or eliminate
the negative consequences of an existing identification.146 Some individuals eliminate an identity by labeling themselves as an “ex-member” of the
group that has been abandoned. Others go so far as derogating other ingroup members as inferior to distance themselves from the stigmatized
group.147 Similarly, identity denial occurs when an individual denies her
2008) (discussing the ways that common law claims have been utilized to protect the rights of
LGBT victims of harassment and discrimination); see generally Carbado, Black Rights, supra note
36; Matthew Clark, Stating a Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace:
The Legal Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313 (2003);
William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let Employment
Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447 (2013); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the
Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915
(1989); Mary Elizabeth Powell, The Claims of Women of Color Under Title VII: The Interaction of
Race and Gender, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413 (1996).
144.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 246-47.
145.
See note 252, infra; Rich, supra note 5, at 1389-90.
146.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 308.
147.
Id. at 245.
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identity and attempts to pass as a member of the majority. In the workplace, successful individual mobility strategies can lead to increased opportunities for higher quality work, business development opportunities, good
evaluations, promotions, and higher pay.148 Towards those ends, three individual mobility strategies are most often employed: converting, passing,
and covering.
“Converting” entails changing one’s underlying identity altogether.
A Muslim woman converts by converting out of Islam into Christianity,
the religion of the dominant social group. She legally changes her birth
name from a Muslim, Arab, or non-white name to an Anglo sounding
name. Her wardrobe and lifestyle eliminate all traces of her Muslim or
non-white identity. She marries a Christian, white male with whom she
socializes in his dominant social group. Their children are raised Christians
with Anglo Saxon names and socialize with other white, Christian children. In the end, the converted Muslim woman completely disassociates
from her Muslim and ethnic identity as she converts into her Christian,
white identity. In her mind and the minds of others, she is a member of
the socially dominant group.
“Passing” occurs when the underlying identity is retained but
masked.149 A Muslim woman who passes hides her Muslim identity by
adopting an Anglo nickname, such as Katy instead of Khadija, but does not
legally change her birth name.150 Although she may associate with some
Muslims privately, she hides these associations from her white, Christian
co-workers. Instead, she strategically socializes with dominant group
members to avoid the stigmatization of being associated with her low status group.151 She partakes in traditionally American social activities such as
dancing, drinking, and having American boyfriends—all of which are at
odds with the Islam practiced by her in-group.152 Her western American
wardrobe does not disclose her ethnic roots or religious identity, and her
marriage to a fair skinned man who also passes as white further obscures
her racial and ethnic identity.153 When her underlying identity is discov148.
See, e.g., Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787 JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (involving an Egyptian Muslim woman who alleged she was deprived
of “(1) opportunities to visit customer sites, (2) one-on-one support, and (3) mentoring
opportunities”).
149.
See Yoshino, supra note 13, at 773.
150.
See, e.g., Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 171 (describing a young Muslim
woman’s fear of being rejected for jobs and other opportunities on account of her Muslim
name).
151.
See Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 382. Cf. Green, supra note 10, at 645 (noting
that informal socialization is an important way that employees obtain coveted work assignments
and promotions).
152.
See generally EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Okla.
2011).
153.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 37, 40; see also id. at 44 (noting that members of the elite
of counters who were colonized caused the population to idolize European culture and demean
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ered, she is often told “I had no idea you were a Muslim or an Arab” to
which she may respond dismissively as an accident of birth and irrelevant
to her self-identification.
The option to convert or pass is available only to persons whose skin
color and phenotype “look white” enough for the dominant social group
to believe they are in fact members of the high status group.154 Otherwise,
attempts to convert or pass leave the person worse off as she is rejected
both by her low status group and the high status group.155 Due to the nonEuropean geographic origins of most Muslim immigrants in America,
converting and passing is available to very few.156 Thus, covering is
adopted by Muslims whose phenotype and physical characteristics are perceived as typical of a particular low status group. It is the most common
form of identity performance employed to avoid stigmatization.157
Covering entails adopting appearances, associations, speech, and behaviors that allay the dominant social group’s discomfort with or fear of
the low status group. The minority engages in racial comforting by allaying the guilt caused by the dominant group’s bias against her low status
group.158 She also engages in racial distancing from her low status in-group
so that she can be viewed as the exception to negative stereotypes, thereby
avoiding stigmatization.159 Ultimately, the individual does not want to be
perceived as “too Black,” “too Muslim,” “too feminist,” or “too Arab”
depending on the stigmatized groups to which she belongs. She seeks to
assuage the dominant group that she will not come to work one day with a
headscarf on, start praying at her desk, or proclaim “Allah Akbar” when
she receives good news. Whether or not she wants to engage in such acts is
irrelevant because her individuality is subsumed in the negative stereotypes
presumed about her low status group.
In covering her identity, a Muslim woman retains and discloses her
underlying identity but performs it in such a way that makes it more palatable for the socially dominant group to not feel threatened by her preslocal culture, and thus passing is a continuation of post-colonial cultural developments in the
Muslim woman’s country of origin). Grillo & Wildman, supra note 19, at 406 (describing “being black and looking white”).
154.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 40.
155.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 258; KHAN, supra note 74, at 32 (discussing
case of woman whose phenotype looked non-white and stereotypically Muslim within Canadian
society such that she was subjected to anti-Muslim bias even though she converted out of Islam).
156.
See Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, The Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight
Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33 (2009) (providing a summary of the diverse races
and ethnicities that comprise the Muslim community in the United States).
157.
Green, supra note 10, at 652 (pressuring minority women to take on behavioral traits
stereotypically associated with and defined by white men and women devalues her race). See e.g.
Gonzalez, supra note 69, at 2201-06 (discussing the prevalence of “covering” as an identity deflection technique).
158.
See Yoshino, supra note 13, at 778.
159.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 382.
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ence. She does not wear a headscarf, she does not speak Arabic or another
foreign language in front of her colleagues, she speaks in the local vernacular accent, straightens her hair, and wears clothes viewed as Western and
liberal as opposed to overly conservative and Islamic.160 She chooses names
for her children that are both Arabic and English such as Sara, Adam,
Zack, Miriam or Sophia so that her children can also cover their Muslim
and ethnic identities.161 She makes an effort to inform her coworkers
about her active participation in traditionally American activities such as
the Parent Teacher Association, volunteering at the Salvation Army, leading her daughter’s Girls Scouts troop, donating to the United Way, and
other typically American extracurricular activities. Even though she may
be a practicing Muslim, she does not publicize her religiosity or seek religious accommodation at work. Nor does she inform her coworkers of her
trips back to her country of origin as this may be perceived as evidence of
divided national loyalties.162
A Muslim woman who covers her identity also goes out of her way
to express her patriotism and does not criticize American foreign policy.163 In attempting to racially comfort her colleagues, the Muslim
woman laughs with her colleagues, rather than complains about, bigoted
jokes about Muslims or her ethnic group, she does not challenge stereotypes that Muslims are more prone to terrorism or Muslim women are
oppressed.164 Indeed, she may go so far as to engage in self-hating humor
about her backward country of origin and fanatical religion to validate
mainstream stereotypes.165 She becomes a “cultural Muslim” rather than a
160.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 117-18. For instances of women facing work-related
consequences for a more overt performance of Muslim identity, see Complaint at 3-7, Spence v.
LaHood, No. 11-3972 JBS/AMD, 2013 WL 355913 (D.N.J. July 5, 2011) (alleging several of
plaintiff’s co-workers made negative comments about her Muslim head covering); Second
Amended Complaint at 3-13, Amna v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, No. 08-CV-2806
(CBA)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2009) (alleging Muslim female of Pakistini descent plaintiff’s
supervisor yelled at her for speaking in her native language and verbally insulted plaintiff in front
of co-workers concerning plaintiff’s English speaking skills).
161.
Changing Muslim names to English sounding names became a common practice after
September 11. Muslim Americans Changing Arabic-sounding Names, USA TODAY, Mar. 20, 2002,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/03/20/arab-names.htm.
162.
See, e.g., Amna, 2011 WL 4592787, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (alleging that
coworker asking female employee of Pakistani descent whether she vacationed in Iraq as implicitly accusing her of supporting terrorism).
163.

See KHAN, supra note 74, at 14.

164.
Amna, 2011 WL 4592787, at *3 (complaining of being subjected to cartoons offensive
to Muslims). See, e.g., Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 50 (discussing nonassertive
responses to prejudice in the form of humor and attempts to placate or appease the perpetrator);
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 49 (laughing at anti-Black racial humor and rating it as
funny is an example of a predicted behavior by automatic white preference).
165.
ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 114 (noting that in the West, Muslim communities
are regularly portrayed as backward and prone to violence); Steele, supra note 34, at 621 (discussing how “negative stereotypes about one’s group eventually become internalized and cause re-
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“real” (bad) Muslim whose embrace and practice of her Islamic and ethnic
identity are viewed as a threat by her coworkers.166 The identity covering
Muslim woman becomes the person her employer points to counter allegations of anti-Muslim, anti-Arab, or even anti-women bias and tout the
employer’s workplace diversity. As a result, her willingness to accommodate coercive assimilationist pressures makes her more vulnerable to being a
token.167
B. Group Enhancement Strategies: Refusing to Perform
Coercive Assimilationism
Not all members of stigmatized groups respond to prejudice through
identity negation or dissociation.168 Individuals highly identified with their
devalued group defend their in-group and derogate the out-group.169 Indeed, some high identifiers respond with anger to the negative perceptions
of their group.170 They view discrimination against their in-group by the
dominant group as a “badge of distinction rather than a mark of
shame.”171 To the high identifiers, the poor outcomes of the in-group in
terms of employment, education, and other socio-economic factors are a
product of discrimination that illegitimately and collectively devalue the
entire group.172 As a result, they are likely to reject dominant group standards, engage in separatism, and place greater value on how they differ
from the dominant group.173
Increased identification with a low status group, also known as identity enhancement or social competition group strategy, maintains a positive
jection of one’s own group, even of oneself—self-hating preferences.”); Swim, Cohen, & Hyers,
supra note 38, at 50 (noting the use of humor to deflect discrimination).
166.
KHAN, supra note 74, at 100 (describing an interview with a Muslim woman who
refused to define Muslim identity based on active religious community participation, but rather
based on an intellectual, objective interest in studying Islam as a culture).
167.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 258-59 (noting that “only a few token
members [of a devalued group” are selectively admitted by the higher status group,” meanwhile
continuing the system that is not in fact providing equal chances for all).
168.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 380 (“belonging to stigmatized or sociallydevalued identity groups does not mean that one personally ascribes to all of the negative connotations that society has associated with one’s group”).
169.

Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 252.

170.

Id. at 251.

171.

Id. at 256.

172.

Id. at 256.

173.
Jolanda Jetten, Nyla Branscombe, Michael Schmitt, Russell Spears, Rebels with a
Cause: Group Identification as a Response to Perceived Discrimination from the Mainstream, 27 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1204, 1205 (2001) (noting that the costs of being
targeted for discrimination can be offset by the psychological benefits derivable from increased
identification with other in-group members); Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 259.
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social identity and self-esteem in the face of prejudice.174 As a consequence, many members of socially devalued groups derive great pride
from their group membership as was the case with Black consciousness
movements in the United States during the Jim Crow era and currently
evinced in gay pride parades.175 Similarly, many Muslims coalesce around
their faith communities to cope with the distress from post-9/11 discriminatory experiences.176 If a person believes that her group’s low status
might be improved and that its low status was assigned illegitimately, then
she is more willing to engage in collective efforts to improve the group’s
position.177
But group-based identity strategies carry significant risks. Highly
identified group members are more susceptible than low identified members to discrimination by dominant groups who respond defensively and
try to strike back at attempts to effectuate social change.178 Refusal to
adhere to the norms set by the dominant social group and negation of
intergroup similarities can preclude the in-group member from access to
valued outcomes such as jobs, access to good schools, and wealth.179 For
example, African Americans who are less acculturated into mainstream
(white) society and more immersed in African culture are more likely to
report experiences of prejudice.180 The highly identified person is viewed
by the higher status group as an extremist or troublemaker, which further
blocks the possibility of acceptance into the higher status group.181
Meanwhile, identity enhancement strategies also entail benefits.
Members of devalued groups who view their common identity with ingroup members improve their psychological well-being and fulfill their
need to belong.182 One study of African American women found that,
“those who feel excluded by their minority group and also perceive high
174.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 244-45; see also Allison, supra note 92, at
156 (summarizing identity formation in three phases: preencounter, immersion/emersion, and
internalization wherein the immersion/emersion phase causes the individual to strongly identify
with one’s ethnic group, reject the majority culture, and find ethnic and racial discrimination
more salient).
175.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 380 (2007).
176.
Ghaffari & Ciftci, supra note 93, at 22.
177.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 249.
178.
Id. at 261.
179.
Id. at 259.
180.
Allison, supra note 92, at 161.
181.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 259; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 66, at
1282-83.
182.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 250; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1028
(noting “core social motive to get along with and feel accepted by one’s group”). In contrast,
rejection by the woman’s in-group results in stress, depression, alienation, and other mental
health problems. Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 258. Several studies link the experience of discrimination to emotional distress and adverse health outcomes. Sexist discrimination
faced by women of color, for example, “accounted for more variance in premenstrual, depres-
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discrimination from the majority exhibit significantly lower self-esteem
than those who feel accepted” by the in-group or out-group.183 Similarly,
studies of Muslims find that higher religiosity is linked to positive methods
of coping with post-9/11 discrimination.184 Strong identification with
one’s devalued group, therefore, can buffer against the negative psychological effects that accrue from feeling excluded from the dominant group.185
Due to the heavy psychological costs and risks arising from identity
negation strategies, some members of low status groups respond to
prejudice through intensified group contact with their in-group.186 Such
contact enhances self-esteem and assists them in coping with stigma as a
means of counteracting discrimination.187 With the endorsement of others
in their in-group, low status members affirm the value of their group
membership rather than incorporate the negative views of the high status
group.188 They voluntarily segregate by seeking refuge in their communities where they can limit interactions with prejudiced high status
groups.189
Examples of group enhancement strategies include attending houses
of worship where attendees are exclusively members of the in-group, limiting socialization outside of work with families within the in-group, enrolling their children in private schools wherein most of the students are
members of the in-group, and living in neighborhoods where the ingroup is the majority.190 Through these activities, individuals develop a
commitment and sense of belonging to the group, a positive evaluation of
the group, and an investment in the success of the group.191 In practicing
what social psychologists call avoidance, the in-group members “move
away from the oppressor” by developing separatist communities, migrating
to less discriminatory locations, and reducing contacts with the majority.192 The in-group members develop a secure sense of self and a strong
sive, obsessive compulsive, somatic, and total psychiatric and physical symptoms than generic
stress.” Allison, supra note 92, at 161.
183.

Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 251.

184.
Ghaffari & Ciftci, supra note 93, at 14-15; see, e.g., Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C
04-01787 JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (involving an Egyptian Musl
im woman who contends that her work environment at Apple changed significantly for the
worse after the September 11th attacks).
185.

Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 251.

186.

Id. at 255.

187.

DEAUX & ETHIER, supra note 78, at 311.

188.

Id.

189.

See Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 39.

190.
See, e.g., Wildman & Davis, supra note 103, at 900-01 (discussing how “in most places
we spend time we are in white settings, unless we act affirmatively to seek a racially integrated
environment”); Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1453.
191.

Phinney, Cantu & Kurtz, supra note 83, at 178.

192.

Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 40.
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ethnic identity, which bolsters their self-esteem.193 Although such strategies may preserve the in-groups’ collective self-esteem, it relieves the majority group of the responsibility for systemic biases as they justify the
segregation and disparate outcomes as reflecting the minority group’s disinterest in racial integration and attendant opportunities.194
Collective social change is another group identity enhancement strategy. Social change strategies aim to change beliefs and behaviors of the
socially dominant group. They seek systemic changes to the social system
to facilitate expression and recognition of their identity without stigmatization. Public education, public relations campaigns, large protests, and
high impact litigation are among the various tactics used to challenge unfair institutional practices and rebuke negative stereotypes.195
In the case of Muslim women, those facing discrimination who respond through group enhancement strategies tighten their grip over their
Muslim identity.196 They believe that Islamic rules and prescriptions can
provide solutions to their everyday problems, including the psychological
pressures arising from coercive assimilation and negative stereotypes about
Islam, Muslim women, and their ethnic group.197 By wearing a headscarf,
193.
See Phinney, Cantu & Kurtz, supra note 83, at 166 (highlighting that numerous studies
found that a strong ethnic identity is positively associated with self-esteem).
194.
See Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 40; see, e.g., Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1832 (1990).
195.
The civil rights movement and the feminist movement, for instance, encouraged its
followers to adopt assertive instead of deferential responses to prejudice. Swim, Cohen & Hyers,
supra note 38, at 50, 52. But note that individuals involved in social change movements are at risk
of burn out by becoming “fatigued from daily confrontations with perpetrators” of prejudice,
resulting in their preference not to respond despite their continued commitment to their lowstatus group. Id. at 53.
196.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 93, 107.
197.
See id. at 108; see generally Franchesca Benzant, Donning the Hijab: My Day as an Undercover Muslim Woman, CLUTCH (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.clutchmagonline.com/2011/12/
donning-the-hijab-my-day-as-an-undercover-muslim-woman/2/ (detailing the author’s experience as part of an outreach effort by the Muslim Women of Maryland challenging women to
wear a hijab for a day. The author also recounted another participant’s post-9/11 experience,
stating, “One girl who was Muslim admitted that this was her first time wearing the hijab since
9/11. She used to be teased to the point students would yank her hijab off of her head and once
it was even thrown in the toilet.”); Nadine Naber, “Look, Mohammed the Terrorist is Coming!”
Cultural Racism, Nation-Based Racism, and the Intersectionality of Oppressions After 9/11, SCHOLAR
& FEMINIST ONLINE (Summer 2008), http://barnard.edu/sfonline/immigration/naber_01.htm
(citing incidents of school children having their headscarf pulled off while commuting to school);
Tanya Somanader, Muslim College Student Reports Sexual Harassment, Gets Reported to FBI For
Terrorism and Expelled, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:15 pm), http://thinkprogress.org/
security/2012/01/18/406061/connecticut-muslim-studentreports-sexual-harassment-gets-reported-to-fbi-for-terrorism-and-expelled-fromuniversity/?mobile=NC. (describing a case from
2009 when an African-American Muslim student at the University of Bridgeport was dismissed
from school after another student falsely accused her of being a terrorist); Paul Harris, Living
With 9/11: The Muslim American, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/sep/05/living-with-911-muslim-american; Tarice Gray, Muslim American Girls
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dressing conservatively in accordance with Islamic principles, and naming
their children identifiably Muslim names, they are engaging in both religious and culture enhancing lifestyles. However, they fear the animus
against their Muslim headscarf or other visible cultural displays will be imputed onto their children through school bullying.198 This may cause them
to become more insular within their religious and ethnic communities in
hopes of shielding their children from exposure to alcohol, drugs, and sex
as well as anti-Muslim prejudice. Group enhancing Muslim women attend
their local mosque more frequently, enroll their children in full time Islamic schools, look for work at Muslim owned businesses, and socialize
only with other Muslims and persons of the same ethnicity.199
Withdrawal is not available to all highly identified members of low
status groups. Although some may seek out employment where their ingroup is predominant, others may have no other choice than to work in an
environment that defines professionalism based on the dominant social
groups’ norms. Moreover, some highly identified members of low status
groups may “refuse to perform” their identities to accommodate coercive
assimiliationist pressures at work. For them, retaining an authentic racial
and religious identity manifested in their dress, names, associations, behavior, language, religious practices, and other cultural displays is vital to their
self-esteem and quality of life.200 They view impositions of dominant social norms as a requirement for employment, promotion, and professional
success as a form of prejudice, and thus contrary to antidiscrimination law
and policy.
Some Muslim women invest in their Muslim identity by redefining it
and taking control of it based on recognition that there is no escaping
mainstream society’s negative stereotypes of Muslim women and Muslims.201 Accordingly, they respond to devaluation of their Muslim and ethnic identities by wearing a headscarf to emphasize their Muslim

Taunted, Assaulted at School for Wearing Hijab, CHANGE (Dec. 21, 2010), http://education.change.org/blog/view/muslim_american_girls_taunted_assaulted_at_school_for_wearing_
hijab (reporting that “The Greater Los Angeles office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIRLA) says it’s hearing from students and their parents saying that children are being
verbally harassed and tagged with labels like ‘terrorist’ or ‘jihadi,’ just for being Muslim and that
girls have reported being physically assaulted for wearing hijab, the traditional headscarf worn by
Muslim women.”).
198.
Rhys H. Williams & Gira Vashi, Hijab and American Muslim Women: Creating the Space
for Autonomous Selves, 68 SOC. OF RELIGION, 269, 271 (2007) (noting that Muslims with the
most visibly different religious practices encountered the greatest discrimination).
199.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 47. Riffat Hassan, Challenging the Stereotypes of Fundamentalism: An Islamic Feminist Perspective, 91 THE MUSLIM WORLD 55, 57 (2011).
200.
See generally DEEPAK CHOPRA, I SPEAK FOR MYSELF: AMERICAN WOMEN ON BEING
MUSLIM (Maria M. Ebrahimji & Zahra T. Suratwala, eds., 2011).
201.

See KHAN, supra note 74, at 101.
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identity.202 The headscarf is their way of resisting assimilationist pressures
while challenging the meaning of the headscarf as a symbol of oppression.203 Many of these headscarved women, as well as non-headscarved
women, engage in social change by participating in public advocacy campaigns and lobbying efforts condemning the rise of anti-Muslim bias after
the September 11th terrorist attacks.204
Not only do those “refusing to perform” affirmatively display their
low status identity at work, but they assertively and publicly respond to
prejudice. When faced with offensive behavior or stereotyping,205 they
visibly communicate their displeasure to the perpetrator.206 They may use
the opportunity to educate the perpetrator about the impropriety and
harms caused by prejudice or file a formal complaint with the employer
seeking reprimand of the perpetrator. Studies of Muslim women wearing
headscarves report that many of them are asked questions about Islam, subjected to racial and religious slurs, or treated unfairly on account of their
Muslim identity.207 This compels them to “represent the race”208 and dispel myths about their religion.209 Despite their efforts to educate or hold
202.
Wagner et al., supra note 39, at 528; ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 18; Williams &
Vashi, supra note 198, at 271.
203.
Williams & Vashi, supra note 198, at 284; ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 17-18
(noting that “[w]omen who cover themselves are assumed to be coerced or capitulating to male
pressure, despite the fact that wearing an enveloping cover is mandatory (in public) in only a few
settings”).
204.
See CENTER FOR RELIGION AND CIVIC CULTURE’S biographies of Hind Makki,
http://crcc.usc.edu/initiatives/amcli/hind-makki.html, Linda Sarsour http://crcc.usc.edu/initiatives/amcli/linda-sarsour.html, and Rabia Chaudry http://crcc.usc.edu/initiatives/amcli/rabia-chaudry.html. The SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER reported that the number of antiMuslim groups tripled in 2001, jumping from 10 groups in 2010 to 30 in 2011. http://
www.splcenter.org/node/3502/activegroups. See generally Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 41 (2011)
(discussing potentially unconstitutional law enforcement interviews with Muslims in the US
counterterrorism era following the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
205.
For example, African Americans report being stared at, glared at, receiving bad service
in public accommodations, and being watched in stores as a common manifestation of negative
racial stereotypes. They also experience verbal expressions of prejudice in the form of racial slurs
and offensive comments. See Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 43.
206.
Id. at 50.
207.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 173; Amna v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, No.
08-CV-2806 (CBA)(LB) 2011 WL 4592787, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2009) (female employee
of Pakistani descent asked by her coworker for informative literature on Islam); see Mirza v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 06-cv-6484, 2009 WL 3824711, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2009). See
generally, Eden B. King & Afra Ahmad, Stereotypes as Justification for Discrimination Toward Religious
Minorities: Interpersonal Discrimination Toward Muslim Job Applicants, 63 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY,
881, 881-906 (2010).
208.
See generally, Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1757-1817 (2003) (discussing critical race theory and its connection
with representation within racial groups).
209.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 173.
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discriminators accountable, majority group members may minimize a
Muslim woman’s objections by suggesting she is oversensitive, paranoid, or
adversarial.210 In turn, this causes retaliation by discrediting the employee
as a trouble maker, which can lead to poor job evaluations alleging “attitude problems,” denials of promotion, job transfer, or termination.211
Although assertive responses to prejudice entail serious risk, failing to
assertively respond also entails risks. The victim that passively absorbs the
prejudice feels disempowered, self-disappointment, and guilt over her failure to defend herself.212 She may develop displaced aggressive or passiveaggressive defiance of behavioral norms that lead to physiological effects
such as higher blood pressure and stress.213 Indeed, studies of African
American women find that those who quietly accepted discrimination
were four times more likely to report hypertension than African American
women who took action or talked to others. Similarly, African American
women who did not report experiencing sexism or racism had a 2.6 times
greater risk of high blood pressure than African Americans women who
reported their experiences as targets of sexism and racism.214
While the social science literature on Muslim women in the United
States is still in its nascency, certain trends are clear. Like other women of
210.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 52-53. See also Elwakin v. Target Media
Partners Operating Co., No. 11-2648, 2012 WL 669068, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 29, 2012) (alleging supervisor made negative comments about her race, national origin, and religion and required her to perform work that her coworkers were not required to perform); Nader v. Brunalli
Constr. Co., No. 98-2085, 2002 WL 724597, at *1-3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2002) (calling plaintiff
a “Scum Arab” and telling him to “go back where [he] came from”); Boutros v. Canton Reg’l
Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1993) (calling the plaintiff a “camel jockey,” a “camel
rider,” a “rich Arab,” and telling him to “go back” to Syria); Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s
Dep’t, No. 07 C 1266, 2009 WL 1210620, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2009) (calling plaintiff a “sand
nigger”).
211.
See, e.g., Gul-E-Rana Mirza v. The Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 837
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (alleging preferential treatment to non-Muslim coworkers resulting in lost commission and poor work assignments); Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787 JW, 2006
WL 889571, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (alleging marginalization in her practice group,
denial of career opportunities, and preferential treatment to less experienced male Caucasian in
the form of premier assignments and quick promotions). See also Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra
note 38, at 52 (discussing various workplace studies that show the high risks of public responses
to prejudice in the workplace including negative effects on terms and conditions of employment); Green, supra note 10, at 641 (noting that performance evaluations are increasingly dependent on others’ perceptions of an individual’s ability or willingness to fit in with prevailing social
expectations and work culture).
212.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 52. Targets of discrimination feel conflicted
“between their desire [to] confront prejudice and promote change and societal pressure for them
to keep quiet to avoid the stigma of the ‘uppity oppressed person.’” Id. Complaint at 5, Zayed,
2006 WL 889571 (challenging employers’ claim that plaintiff “had an adversarial, extremely
defensive attitude” as pretext for disparate treatment that started soon after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks).
213.

Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 52.

214.

Allison, supra note 92, at 160.
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color, Muslim women face stereotypes and identity performance pressures
both within their religious and ethnic communities as well as mainstream
society. Often times these pressures are contradictory such that regardless
how a particular Muslim woman responds to coercive assimilationism—
through individual mobility or group enhancement strategies—she is
caught in a Catch 22.215
III. THE TRIPLE BIND: IRRECONCILABLE INTERGROUP,
INTRAGROUP, AND INTERSECTIONAL IDENTITY
PERFORMANCE PRESSURES
Much of the literature on performance identity revolves around the
psychological, economic, and physical harms associated with accommodating or rejecting what I call “coercive assimilationism” in the workplace.
However, scholarship on women of color in the workplace has yet to address the triple bind faced by Muslim women of color, thereby making
them vulnerable to discrimination irrespective of how they perform their
identity.216
Women in the American workplace experience identity performance
pressures to be deferential to (male) authority at work, conceal their ambition,217 avoid being assertive,218 be feminine but firm,219 accept lower pay
than their male counterpart,220 and be thin and attractive but not sexy.221
215.
All the while, her choices operate within a particular political and social situation
shaped more by power than individual autonomy. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Variations on Sex and
Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig and Foucault, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF
GENDER, 128, 139-40 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell, eds., 1987); see also LILA ABULUGHOD, supra note 41, at 19 (2013) (noting that Americans’ indictments of Muslim women’s
relative lack of choice ignores “the extent to which all choice is conditioned by as well as imbricated with power, and the extent to which choice itself is an impoverished account of
freedom.”).
216.
Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis, supra note 108, at 339-40 (explaining that classifying “Muslim women’s employment discrimination claims solely under the umbrella of religious discrimination obscures the ways in which an employer’s ban against a hijab bears on the
very nature of one’s identity as a woman of Muslim faith.”).
217.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 17 (noting that being called “very ambitious” is not a
compliment when directed at a woman, in contrast to men).
218.
Id. at 41.
219.
See Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice: The Inability of Current Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20-21 (2007) (arguing that in a world where men and women are increasingly
permitted to have both “feminine” or “masculine” preferences, the current antidiscrimination
model does not adequately ensure equality for all persons).
220.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 22 (noting that because men generally earn more than
women, people expect women to earn less, including women). See also Harris, Theorizing Class,
supra note 14, at 46 (explaining that the male-derived norm of “ideal worker” caused the
gendering of wages).
221.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 42 (discussing women’s experience with sexism as tied to
gender stereotypes that produce objectifying sexual comments about women’s bodies and insult-
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Starting at a young age, American society reprimands girls for being too
bossy when they lead while boys are praised as engaging.222 Girls are also
acculturated to fear being disliked, drawing negative attention, or overreaching.223 Thus, aggressive and hard-charging professional women violate unwritten rules about acceptable social behavior.224
Meanwhile, when women employees possess a particular skill, ability
or background, such qualities tend to carry less weight based on subjectively defined “merit” systems that hostile or unsympathetic superiors can
use to justify discrimination.225 For instance, women leaders who exhibit
professional success are stigmatized as unlikeable,226 whereas
“[e]ntrenched cultural ideas associate men with leadership qualities and
women with nurturing qualities.”227 These same nurturing qualities cause
some employers to refrain from hiring or promoting women based on
doubts of women’s long term commitments to the job and their careers.228
Cumulatively, this leads to working women experiencing greater role conflict than men and higher stress levels.229
At the same time, parts of the American public view Muslims as
highly suspect after the events of September 11th.230 Muslim employees,
therefore, feel pressures to prove their patriotism and be on their best being, degrading, or sexist attitudes about women); Bethany A. Teachman et al., Demonstrations of
Implicit Anti-Fat Bias: The Impact of Providing Casual Information and Evoking Empathy, 22. HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 68, 68; Regina Pignitore et al., Bias Against Overweight Job Applicants in a Simulated
Employment Interview, 79 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 910. See also KHAN, supra note 74, at 32
(discussing Muslim women who converted out of Islam to be free of control by Muslim relatives
over their sexuality only to discover that they are still subjected to sexism within mainstream
society).
222.
See SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 19; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 88-89
(suggesting that a common stereotype is to associate men with leadership).
223.

SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 24.

224.

Id. at 17.

225.

Id. at 152.

226.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 161; BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 117 (reporting a study wherein job seekers were willing to accept less pay to work with a male supervisor rather than accept a higher paying job with a female boss); Borgida et. al., supra note 46, at
620-21.
227.

SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 42-43; Allison, supra note 92, at 152.

228.

See SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 42-43; Borgida et. al., supra note 46, at 616.

229.
See Allison, supra note 92, at 152, 155 (discussing research that shows working women
experience conflict between being a mother and an employee undergirded in party by gender
stereotypes).
230.
See, e.g., Rich, supra note 5, at 1250 (describing how an employer “in the wake of
September 11th, issued a directive to midwestern field offices not to use persons with accents on
any delivery run in a federal building because these couriers were more likely to be stopped by
security”); See also King & Ahmad, supra note 207, at 881-901; Sheridan, supra note 113, at 31722.
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havior lest they be investigated for ties to terrorism.231 Not only must a
Muslim woman of color decide whether she is willing to succumb to coercive assimilationist demands, but she may not be able to do so in light of
the contradictory demands on her identity. Being a “Good Muslim
Woman” as defined by the dominant social group may avoid the adverse
effects of negative stereotypes against Muslim women but at the same time
trigger negative stereotypes of women, immigrants, and Muslims.232
These contradictory demands expose Muslim women of color to
identity-based discrimination irrespective of their willingness or ability to
accommodate coercive assimilationism in the workplace; making the incorporation of identity-based discrimination into Title VII jurisprudence
all the more compelling.
A. Sandwiched Between Intragroup and Intergroup Identity
Performance Pressures
Meek, oppressed, and subjugated Muslim women are purportedly in
need of saving by American feminism and liberalism.233 Lacking individual
agency, Muslim women are viewed as charity cases adopted to appease
American liberals’ ambivalence towards their government’s interventions
in Muslim majority countries.234 To avoid the harsh reality that America’s
imperialistic endeavors make women (and men) worse off, American feminists and liberals justify military occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan as a
means of liberating Muslim women from the yokes of oppressive patriarchal Islam. Hence much is vested in these negative stereotypes of Muslim
women—politically and economically.235
231.
See Report Muslim Americans: Faith, Freedom, and the Future. Examining U.S. Muslim’s Political, Social, and Spiritual Engagement 10 Years After September 11 (Aug. 2011), http://
www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153611/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-Faith-FreedomFuture.aspx (A majority of Americans of every faith see Muslim Americans as being loyal to their
country 93 percent of Muslims, 80 percent of Jews, but surprisingly only 59 percent of
Catholics, and 56 percent of Protestants ). See, e.g., Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787
JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (involving an Egyptian Muslim woman
who contents that her work environment at Apple changed significantly for the worse after the
September 11th attacks).
232.
See, e.g., Zainalizadeh v. Neiman Marcus Grp., No. C 01-4207 JL, 2002 WL
31007465, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2002) (Muslim woman alleging that she received bad evaluations because she was “too aggressive” and “too strong”).
233.
ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 95 (noting the public appetite for depictions of sordid
and brutal treatment of women by Muslim or Arab men in “memoirs” of suffering by oppressed
Muslim women enjoy spectacular and strangely enduring popularity).
234.
Id. at 107 (arguing that stories of oppressed Muslim women by Muslim women in the
West contribute towards normalization of political and military hostility toward countries like
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq); Naber, supra note 40, at 193.
235.
Id. at 20 (“Representations of the unfreedom of others that blame the chains of culture incite rescue missions by outsiders. Such representations . . . deflect attention from the social
and political forces that are responsible for the ways people live.”).
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After the September 11th attacks, the project to “save Muslim
women” became more complicated.236 The headscarf and other forms of
traditional Islamic dress came to signify a threat rather than a vulnerability.237 Muslim women were no longer perceived as benign, helpless creatures in dire need of rescue, but rather suspiciously associated with their
terrorist husbands, sons, and fathers, and “[the label ‘terrorist’ . . . seeped
corporeally and discursively onto the[ir] female Muslim bod[ies].”238
American feminists and liberals found themselves conflicted between Orientalist infantilization of Muslim women239 and the new clash of civilizations between the purported free Christian West and the violent Muslim
East.
As Islamophobia gripped the American public,240 Muslim women
donning headscarves found themselves physically attacked in public,
evicted from courtrooms, and their children bullied.241 At work, women
identifiably Muslim through dress or identity performance experienced
hostile work environments as they were called terrorists, accused of disloyalty, and treated as a fifth column.242 Many could not obtain employment
236.

Id. at 4-9.

237.
Id. at 17-18; Aziz, supra note 111, at 192; Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis, supra
note 108, at 340 (explaining that “in a post-9/11 context, for some, a hijab is a symbol of
racialized, religious, and gendered otherness denoting patriarchal subordination, and attendant
radicalism and violent threats to socio-political normativity as well as national security, which
justifies governmental and private measures to shrink its visibility in myriad spheres”); see, e.g.,
Arshad Imtiaz Ali, Finding Home: Formulations of Race and Nationhood Among Muslim College Students in Southern California (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles).
238.

Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 175.

239.
KHAN, supra note 74, at xii (arguing that Muslim women are often viewed in simplistic and limiting ways as part of an undifferentiated and homogenized “Muslim woman” who
cannot be thoughtful, independent, and progressive if she identifies with her religious
community).
240.
An April 2013 Economist poll found that 44 percent of Americans believe Muslims
are less patriotic than other Americans, 51 percent of Muslims are as patriotic as other Americans, and 5 percent believed that Muslims are more patriotic than other Americans. See, e.g.,
Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787 JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5,
2006) (involving employee placing red, white, and blue ribbons outside of every employee’s
office door as a symbol of unity and patriotism and not placing a ribbon on Egyptian Muslim
woman employee’s door).
241.
Aziz, supra note 111, at 239; see also Akram & Johnson, supra note 40, at 296 (asserting
that “after September 11, hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims and others rose precipitously.”).
242.
Aziz, supra note 111, at 211. See, e.g., Ara v. Tedeschi Food Shops, Inc., 794 F. Supp.
2d 259, 261 (D. Mass. 2011) (involving a Muslim woman of Bangladeshi descent alleging her
manager showed her a picture of Sadaam Hussein after he was killed and told her “your leader is
finished,” stated that Bangladesh was the number one terrorist country, and threw out a job
application by applicant with Muslim sounding name); Mowafy v. Noramco of Del., 620 F.
Supp. 2d 603, 607-08 (D. Del. 2009) (coworker asked Egyptian Muslim woman why Muslims
produce so many terrorists and screamed in fright upon observing her conducting her daily
prayers at work); Zayed, 2006 WL 889571, at *1 (involving employees placing red, white, and
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without removing their headscarves while others refrained from requesting
religious accommodation from fear of retaliation.243
Facing the brunt of both negative stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists
and gender stereotypes of Muslim women as weak and oppressed, Muslim
female employees are caught in a triple bind. The more assertive Muslim
women behave to cast off misperceptions of their passivity, the more
threatening they are as Muslims to their coworkers. At the same time,
Muslim women’s assertiveness may violate gender norms further exposing
them to discrimination based on gender stereotyping. But any attempts to
exercise deference to allay suspicions of their loyalty reinforce stereotypes
of their submissiveness and inability to lead.244 And further complicating
their predicament, the women’s non-white status imputes upon them additional negative stereotypes specific to their ethnicity or race.245
Muslim women also experience pressures to perform their identities
to accommodate intragroup gender norms. Many Muslims in the United
States are first or second generation immigrants of non-European origin.246 Similar to other immigrant communities, they are developing new
identities shaped by American culture, cultural practices from their coun-

blue ribbons outside of every employee’s office door as a symbol of unity and patriotism and not
placing a ribbon on Egyptian Muslim woman employee’s door).
243.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279 (N.D. Okla.
2011) (In 2006, Abercrombie’s human resources department approved a head scarf exception to
its “Look Policy,” but later denied employment to a Muslim teenager who wore a head scarf).
244.

Read & Bartkowski, supra note 1, at 396; Yuracko, supra note 1, at 7.

245.
Browne & Misra, supra note 107, at 490; William H. Turner, Myths and Stereotypes: The
African Man, in America, in THE BLACK MALE IN AMERICA 123 (Doris Y. Wilkinson & Ronald
L. Taylor eds., 1977); see also Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination
Against African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination,
36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 34-35 (1996) (discussing the stereotypical perceptions of African-American men by white Americans and by foreigners); Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers, 38 SOC. PROBS. 433, 440 (1991)
(finding that 47.2 percent of Chicago employers surveyed felt that inner-city African-American
workers in selected occupations lacked work ethic); Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship – How
Islamophobia is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2012)
(explaining that Arabs have “collectively been indicted. . .as public enemy #1 - brutal, heartless,
uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural ‘others’ bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews. . .Arabs are brute murderers, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and abusers of women”); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent”
Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (1994) (Asians are stereotyped as
the “model minority” implying that “Asian Americans, through their hard work, intelligence,
and emphasis on education and achievement, have been successful in American society”). But see
Miranda Oshige McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the “Model Minority Myth”, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 331, 331 (2006) (arguing that the “positive image of Asian Americans as a model minority
conceals a more sinister core of beliefs about Asian Americans and other racial minorities in
America”).
246.

See Gallup Report, supra note 231, at 5.
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tries of origin, and religious practices.247 As a consequence, Muslim communities are experiencing significant tensions arising from disagreements
between immigrant and American born members and various ethnic
groups with competing visions of the future of Islam in America.248 Intracommunity gender norms are currently under pressure to adapt to the new
economic and social environment where many Muslims are experiencing
for the first time the stigma attendant with ethnic and religious minority
status.249 Yet, they still face pressures to conform to cultural traditions and
practices based on Islamic principles or cultural practices from their country of origin.250
Within some Muslim communities, Muslim women face familial
pressures to control their sexuality and mobility because women’s morality
reflects on the morality of their families and religious and ethnic communities’ writ large.251 As a result, many Muslim women are pressured to
follow in-group gender norms that mandate finding a suitable husband
approved by their families and preserving the family’s reputation. Indeed,
unmarried Muslim women often lament the pressures of living between
different worlds wherein they worry about the social price their parents
may pay for their choices in violation of traditional Islamic gender
norms.252
Having to compartmentalize parts of their identities to exist in their
different worlds at home, school, and their peer worlds, Muslim women
face contradictory identity pressures.253 Conscious of being scrutinized by
the government, their religious communities, and their families, young
Muslim women carry a heavy burden of living between and within multiple cultures and selves.254 As wives, they are expected to prioritize their
family’s needs over their own professional ambitions resulting in “off
ramping” from their careers, an experience affecting many American
247.
See generally Cyra Akila Choudhury, Terrorists & Muslims: The Construction, Performance,
and Regulation of Muslim Identities in the Post 9/11 United States, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 4
(2006) (disproving the notion that there is a “singular Muslim world, a Muslim culture, a singular
Muslim community and to challenge various other reductionist tendencies that elide and repair
fragmentations of identity in most Muslims in the West in ways that describe caricatures rather
than complex realities.”).
248.
See, generally, NABER, supra note 40 (describing the complex and contradictory cultural and political processes through which Arabness is forged within the United States).
249.
See Choudhury, supra note 247, at 22.
250.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 59.
251.
Id. at 37, 59; see, e.g., NABER, supra note 40, at 164-65.
252.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 172. See generally, LOVE, INSHALLAH: THE SECRET LOVE LIVES OF AMERICAN MUSLIM WOMEN (Nura Maznavi & Ayesha Mattu eds., 2012)
(discussing the varied experiences of Muslim American women who are caught between traditional values and pressures of the modern world). See, e.g., Shabana Mir, MUSLIM AMERICAN
WOMEN ON CAMPUS: UNDERGRADUATE SOCIAL LIFE AND IDENTITY (UNC Press 2014).
253.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 169.
254.
Id. at 172.
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working mothers.255 The more conservative her religious and ethnic community, the more socially conservative and traditional she is expected to
behave, including devoting her life to working inside the home. Failure to
accommodate what she views as misogynist or anachronistic cultural practices may result in expulsion from her religious and ethnic community,
which entails significant psychological costs.256
At work, Muslim mothers face the same pressures as other women
who struggle to balance their careers with their family commitments.
They, too, are suspected by their employer of prioritizing family over
work such that higher quality work, promotions, and opportunities that
lead to long term success and prestige are denied.257 To offset this stereotype, they feel pressure to work more hours than their male colleagues and
demonstrate their willingness to put work over family even if the same is
not expected of male colleagues.258 All the while, they must be firm but
pleasant leaders who keep a smile on their face while male colleagues are
forgiven for emotional outbursts caused by the stresses of the job.259
Like other women, Muslim women must cautiously guard their professional ambition so as to avoid triggering resentment for being “too political,” “too aggressive,” or “not a team player.”260 And their personal
presentation must adhere to traditional notions of femininity and attractiveness, but be careful not to be seen as too sexy such that they will not be
taken seriously or invite sexual harassment.261 In the end, Muslim
women’s appearances and behaviors are heavily scrutinized and judged
based on prevailing gender stereotypes.
But the scrutiny does not end there. They are also subject to stereotypes of Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular. The American public views Muslims as highly suspect, inclined to engage in or
support terrorism, and foreigners from uncivilized nations.262 Muslim
255.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 98.
256.
Branscombe et al., supra note 37, at 137 (noting that social exclusion caused by feelings of rejection due to cultural estrangement has been found to result in anxiety, depression, and
lowered self-esteem); KHAN, supra note 74, at 15.
257.
See SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 114.
258.
See Gene Marks, Why Most Women Will Never Become CEO, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2011,
7:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2011/10/31/why-most-womenwill-never-become-ceo/.
259.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 43, 165 (“When a woman does anything that signals she
might not be nice first and foremost, it creates a negative impression and makes us uncomfortable.”) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260.
Id. at 40-41.
261.
Swim, Cohen & Hyers, supra note 38, at 47 (highlighting that compared to men,
women report experiencing nearly twice as many total number of sexist events directed at themselves and their own gender group).
262.
Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, 2583 (2007); Ramzi
Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 144 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1457 (2009-2010) (“[S]urveys of the general Ameri-
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communities are accused of treating Muslim women as property who must
obey their husbands and fathers.263 Muslim women, therefore, are pressured to perform a “Good Muslim Woman” whose assertiveness counters
misperceptions about her inability to lead and think independently. Her
liberal Americanized dress, consumption of alcohol, and romantic relations
with non-Muslims signals full assimilation into American culture. She
must also be a “Good Muslim” who repeatedly expresses her patriotism,
criticizes her country of origin as backwards, agrees that Islam breeds terrorists, and supports selective counterterrorism enforcement against Muslims as necessary for America’s national security.
Regardless of how each woman responds to these conflicting identity
pressures, she is often assumed to lack agency by the dominant social group
or the Muslim community who view her behavior as a product of coercion or brainwashing by the other group.264 The same rebellious nature
she employs to fight against coercive assimilationism at work may cause her
grief within the Muslim community she seeks to defend, reform, and belong. Her demands to reinterpret Islamic doctrine and practices, particularly as they apply to women, invite accusations of religious subversion.265
As she is pulled in multiple directions by pressures to perform TO intragroup and intergroup identity demands, each woman struggles to negotiate the contradictions to develop an authentic identity that allows for both
professional success and psychological well-being.266
B. Negotiating the Contradictions
As women at the intersection of various stereotypes, Muslim women
of color form a hybridized identity that rescripts notions of what it means
to be a Muslim woman, a Muslim, a member of her ethnic or racial group,
and a woman.267 They negotiate their sense of self in a politically charged
can public confirm that Muslim Americans are widely viewed with distrust and that anti-Muslim
sentiment has burgeoned in the United States post-9/11. A 2004 poll found that 47% of respondents believed that Islam is more likely to encourage violence compared to other religions, and
44% agreed that the government should subject Muslim Americans to additional scrutiny, such
as mandatory registration with the federal government, targeted profiling of citizens based on
their Muslim or Middle Eastern background, increased surveillance of mosques, and use of undercover law enforcement agents in mosques and Islamic civic organizations.”) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Amna v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, No. 08-CV-2806 (CBA)(LB) 2011 WL
4592787 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (alleging that coworker asking female employee of
Pakistani descent whether she vacationed in Iraq as implicitly accusing her of supporting
terrorism).
263.
See, e.g., NABER, supra note 40, at 165-66.
264.
ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 17-18 (noting that Muslim women’s quest for equality is hostage to political forces including the war on terror and intracommunity patriarchal
interpretations of Islam); NABER, supra note 40, at 170.
265.
See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 74, at 48-49.
266.
See, e.g., id. at 34.
267.
See id. at 105.
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environment marred by intolerance within mainstream society, and at
times, within their Muslim communities.268 They resist and destabilize assumptions about members of their identity groups to show the dynamic
nature of identity.269
As hybridized subjects, they reject the polarity between Orientalism,270 that imposes racist colonial imagery of Muslims as savages and
Muslim women as their oppressed victims, and politicized Islam, that essentializes the ideal Muslim woman as an obedient wife, self-sacrificing
mother, and apolitical follower of male religious leadership.271 Notwithstanding their intragroup contestations, many Muslim women deem the
cases of female oppression over-emphasized by out-group Western authors
as bad faith and profit-driven efforts to reinforce cultural hierarchy and
racism against Muslims.272 Seldom do Western audiences contextualize the
extreme cases within the victim’s socio-economic, geographic, and individual circumstances.273 Nor are Western audiences informed that the
male bad actors are violating Islamic beliefs.274 Refusing to be pigeon
holed as either oppressed or liberated, Muslim women in the United States
are negotiating their identities into the politics of race, ethnicity, migrant
communities in the diaspora, and their family life.275
Women who identify as Muslims vary “greatly in terms of their levels
of religiosity, [ ]ranging from cultural to spiritual” to devout.276 Some
Muslim women accept religious and cultural rituals as integral to what
they deem is their authentic identity, while at the same time rejecting the
sexism found in some Islamic practices. The headscarf, for example, allows
many women to create cultural space that reflect their hybridized identities.277 Some Muslim women who choose to wear the headscarf do so to
insulate themselves from intracommunity restrictions that accompany their
status as unmarried women.278 Other Muslim women don a headscarf as a
268.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 168.
269.
KHAN, supra note 74, at xi.
270.
See generally, EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979) (defined political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny ,and so on).
271.
See KHAN, supra note 74, at 21-22 (arguing that “both poles essentialize the ideal
Muslim woman and reduce her to similar symbols and icons.”).
272.
See generally ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 113-28 (discussing the way Westerners
popularized honor crimes to the detriment of Muslims.).
273.
See id. at 128.
274.
See id. at 139.
275.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 168; see KHAN, supra note 74, at 2, 97 (noting
that some women react to Orientalist and racist stereotypes by identifying as a Muslim woman
but refusing to accept male-centric visions of Islam).
276.
Zaal, Salah & Fine, supra note 35, at 169.
277.
See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (N.D. Okla. 2011)
(noting the plaintiff considers her headscarf “a representation and reminder of her faith, a religious symbol, a symbol of Islam and of modesty”); Williams & Vashi, supra note 198, at 272.
278.
See generally Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis, supra note 108, at 354.
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form of resistance against the sexualization of women in American society.279 In doing so, their headscarves signal to society, and men in particular, their religiosity and adherence to Islamic tenets of pre-marital
abstinence.280 By using the headscarf to elude gendered restrictions, they
are able to take advantage of educational and employment opportunities
while retaining their membership within their traditional Muslim
community.281
Some Muslim women embrace parts of traditional Muslim female
identity arising from a subconscious need to belong to the community or
genuine spiritual belief in such practices.282 But these same women may
refuse to perform other parts of traditional Muslim female identity based
on their individualized conception of Muslim feminism.283 They conduct
their own research of Islam and decide what they will accept or reject,
thereby bestowing upon themselves agency to decide how to shape their
intersectional identities.284 As a result, they may contest the traditional
view that the headscarf is mandatory.285 Instead, they may view the headscarf as either optional or a patriarchal tool to control women originating
in male, not divine, prerogatives.286 They claim a space for themselves
within their diverse Muslim communities through a rereading of Islamic
codes and practices, and negotiate a hybridized Muslim female identity.287
In the end, having the space to develop an authentic identity that reflects a
Muslim woman’s individual values, norms, and religious beliefs free of disparate treatment is consistent with the purpose and spirit of Title VII.
279.
See, e.g., id. at 354.
280.
Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441,
449 (2008); Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis, supra note 108, at 354 (recognizing that “many
Muslim women wear a head covering as a reflection of their spiritual and physical modesty in
observance of their religious beliefs”).
281.
Williams & Vashi, supra note 198, at 272; Read & Bartkowski, supra note 1, at 405
(noting some women believed that hijab allowed them to engage in public-sphere pursuits free of
the over-sexualization of women). See Abercrombie & Fitch, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (noting
the plaintiff considers her headscarf “a representation and reminder of her faith, a religious symbol, a symbol of Islam and of modesty”).
282.
KHAN, supra note 74, at 34 (finding that some women become depressed when they
are unable to resolve the multiple contradictions and develop an aversion to both their Muslim
community and mainstream society, leaving them feeling with no sense of belonging to any
particular group); Wagner et al., supra note 39, at 533 (2012).
283.
KHAN, supra note 74, at 46, 114 (observing that structural contradictions in Muslim
women’s identity do not pose a problem because they reject sexist interpretations of the Quran
and consequent practices and stereotypes).
284.
Id. at 114.
285.
Read & Bartkowski, supra note 1, at 407; see also Williams & Vashi, supra note 198, at
270 (noting that many, though not all, Muslims consider wearing the headscarf as theologically
mandated).
286.
Read & Bartkowski, supra note 1, at 407-08.
287.
KHAN, supra note 74, at 42.
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Current workplace antidiscrimination doctrine, however, fails to take
these nuances into account. The following section makes recommendations on how Title VII jurisprudence can be better informed by the complex ways identity performance pressures disproportionately impose harms
on protected classes of employees.
IV. EXPANDING TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE
WITH DISCRIMINATION

TO

KEEP UP

Although the harms caused by pressures to perform one’s identity to
comport with coercive assimilationism are well documented,288 the question still remains as to whether the law can provide adequate relief without
unduly burdening employers. Courts are understandably skeptical of deputizing employers to serve as identity gatekeepers. Similarly, employee advocates do not seek to legitimize essentialist portrayals of low status
groups—a real risk that comes with granting employers authority to define
what traits are authentic to a particular identity such that they are protected
by Title VII. Hence the law and the courts must be careful to balance the
interests of employees’ legal rights to meaningful equal opportunity with
the employer’s interest in evaluating employees based on bona fide job
related qualifications.
This section proposes that existing Title VII jurisprudence prohibiting employment discrimination based on sex stereotyping should be expanded to include ethnic, racial, and religious stereotyping to protect
employees who competently perform their jobs but do not or cannot perform their identities in accordance with coercive assimilationism. Such
protections are especially important for Muslim women of color who are
faced with the triple bind of having to perform the conflicting identity
demands of the “Good Muslim Woman,” the “Good Woman,” and the
“Good Muslim.”
Part A starts by arguing that courts should expand Title VII jurisprudence by incorporating social psychology and implicit bias studies. In turn,
Part B proffers that the seminal gender stereotyping case Price Waterhouse
Cooper v. Hopkins provides a doctrinal foundation for applying stereotyping
theory to Title VII jurisprudence. Part C examines how courts have failed
to incorporate race and ethnicity into workplace stereotyping doctrine,
leaving racial, ethnic, and religious minority plaintiffs subject to coercive
assimilationist pressures based on negative implicit stereotypes with no legal recourse. Finally, Part D analyzes the unique case of Muslim women of
color as further support for the claim that courts are failing to keep up
with the changing nature of discrimination. For these reasons, courts
should incorporate stereotyping and implicit bias theory into disparate
treatment jurisprudence such that intergroup discrimination based on intragroup differences falls under Title VII’s protection.
288.

Yoshino, supra note 13, at 787.
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A. Incorporating Implicit Bias Analysis into Title VII
While Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate, courts are tasked
with defining what discrimination means and what actions meet the definition.289 Notwithstanding advances in the understanding of bias and discrimination in the social psychology literature, judicial constructions of
discrimination rely on the courts’ layperson understandings of the nature
of psychological processes that produce bias.290 For instance, implicit stereotyping theory has minimally influenced federal disparate treatment jurisprudence notwithstanding its prevalence in the social psychology literature
on bias.291 Moreover, the belief that America is “post-racial” such that
systemic discrimination is now a thing of the past causes judges to recognize only the most egregious forms of discrimination while overlooking
the rise in discrimination caused by implicit bias and stereotyping.292
For a plaintiff to prove a prima facie discrimination case under Title
VII’s disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff must establish the following
three things: (1) she is a member of a Title VII protected class; (2) she was
subjected to some negative employment action such as failure to hire or
promote, termination, demotion; and (3) her protected group status was a
“motivating factor” in the challenged employment action.293 The burden
of proof then shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Upon doing so, the employee must then prove the employer’s proffered reasons were pretext for
discrimination.294
To prove that her protected group status was a “motivating factor” in
the challenged employment action, courts require plaintiffs to bring forth
persuasive evidence of the employer’s intent to discriminate or that impermissible stereotypes played a role in the employer’s decision making.295 In
289.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1030.
290.
Id. at 1030-31.
291.
Id. at 1032; Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1379-80; Rich, supra note 5, at 138384.
292.
See generally Evan P. Apfelbaum, Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers, Racial Color
Blindness: Emergence, Practice, and Implications, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., 205209 (2012); Tessa M. Ditonto, Richard R. Lau & David O. Sears, AMPing Racial Attitudes:
Comparing the Power of Explicit and Implicit Racism Measures in 2008, 34 POLIT. PSYCHOL. 487
(2013); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV., 1023, 1048-49 (2010).
293.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92-93 (2003).
294.
See generally McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); Mirza v.
Neiman Marcus Grp. Inc., 649 F.2d 837, 849 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Zayed v. Apple Computers, No.
C 04-01787 JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *9-11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (showing a protected
characteristic was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action is required to establish
Title VII liability).
295.
Per McDonnell-Douglass, at the prima facie stage, in order to justify mandating an
employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,
the plaintiff must produce persuasive evidence that raises a presumption of unlawful discrimina-
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Price Waterhouse Cooper, Justice Brennan explained that a protected class is a
motivating factor “if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision
what its reason were and if we received a truthful response, one of those
reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.”296 Brennan’s reasoning assumes the discriminator was conscious that he was discriminating at the time he made the decision.297 However, numerous
social psychology studies demonstrate that “disparate treatment can result
from . . . implicit stereotypes” and subconscious biases, in addition to “deliberate, fully conscious” bias.298
Whether implicit bias contributes to discrimination depends on “the
extent to which particular social norms are [ ] salient in [a] particular
situation[ ], [the] decision makers’ perceptions of control,” “relevant information” available, and the decision maker’s “motivation to avoid biased
decision making.”299 A well-meaning decision maker may be unaware that
her employment decision was based on her biased judgment of a negatively
stereotyped employee.300 And yet, courts often reject implicit stereotyping
because judicially constructed understandings of discrimination follow Justice Brennan’s reasoning that presumes bias is explicitly expressed and operates with the discriminator’s knowledge.301
As shown in Part I, the psychological science has increasingly refined
understandings of how implicit prejudices bias the social judgments and
choices of people. Subjective construal of a situation is influenced by a
variety of factors arising from social stereotypes such that biases may opertion. 411 U.S. 792; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
After Desert Palace and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, if the plaintiff has produced sufficiently persuasive evidence that an impermissible characteristic is a motivating factor for the adverse employment action, then the plaintiff has established Title VII liability. 539 U.S. 90, 92-94. Doing so
then shifts the burden of production and persuasion on the employer to demonstrate that it
actually relied upon the proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason in its decisionmaking process and that it would have made the same decision regardless of the impermissible characteristic
(which the plaintiff has successfully demonstrated was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision). But see the cases involving the Age Discrimination in Employment Act where
courts acknowledge that an employer can be “motivated” by an applicant or employee’s age
through the operation of implicit stereotypes. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d
149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that age discrimination may arise from an unconscious application of stereotyped notions of ability); La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750
F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Age discrimination may be subtle and even unconscious.”);
Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that age discrimination
may exist absent an intent to discriminate).
296.
Price Waterhouse Cooper v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989); see also Krieger &
Fiske, supra note 6, at 1030.
297.

Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1030.

298.

Id. at 1059, 1032-33.

299.

Id. at 1036, 1050.

300.

Id.

301.

Id. at 1030; Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1379.
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ate outside of the perceiver’s conscious, attentional focus.302 Decision
makers, therefore, may believe their lukewarm or negative evaluations of
employees are based exclusively on legitimate non-discriminatory reasons
when in fact they may be based on perceptions and judgments tainted by
stereotypes.303 They may subconsciously give high status group members
the benefit of the doubt, be more forgiving of their mistakes, and mentor
them while imposing a higher burden to prove competency on low status
group members.304
As a consequence, Muslim women of color face three dilemmas with
regard to their social identity. First, Muslim women are pressured to perform their identity to assimilate into the dominant social group’s norms
and culture305 while facing intragroup pressures by their communities that
contradict assimilationist demands.306 Second, Muslim women of color
who choose to succumb to assimilationist identity pressures may find it is
simply not possible to evade adverse treatment. The multiple stereotypes
and contradictory performance expectations related to their multiple identities as women, Muslims, ethnic minorities, and Muslim women create a
no-win situation. Third, the diversity among headscarved and non-headscarved Muslim women of color is obscured by an artificial polarity between assimilation and multiculturalism, stripping them of individual
agency—the same Orientalist critique directed at Muslim societies.307 Ultimately, Muslim women face a false binary between full assimilation requiring that they dis-identify completely from their low status identities or
reject altogether dominant group standards, when in reality, their social
identities fall within a wide spectrum between multiple poles.
Incorporating stereotyping and implicit bias into Title VII is certainly
not risk free. Richard Ford reasonably argues that identity-based claims
302.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1027 (noting, however, that social stereotypes “can
be controlled . . . through . . . effortful, deliberate, cognitive ‘correction’”); Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 66, 1288.
303.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1051-52.
304.
See, e.g., Rich, supra note 5; see also Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787 JW,
2006 WL 889571, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) (alleging marginalization in her practice
group, denial of career opportunities, and preferential treatment given to less experienced male
Caucasian employees in the form of premier assignments and quick promotions).
305.
TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE 28 (2000) (defining culture as a “quasideterministic concept, meaning those features of social life – custom, kinship, language, ritual,
mythology – which choose us far more than we choose them”); Green, supra note 10, at 631
(noting the common understanding of culture in American society as a tool to “distinguish the
other. . .in social rather than biological terms”).
306.
ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 41, at 117.
307.
See, e.g., EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1970). ABU-LUGHOD; supra note 41, at 117;
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR, AND THE
ROOTS OF TERROR (2004). See generally Kyle Spencer, Fraternity Life, Islamic Style, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/education/edlife/greek-life-islamicstyle.html?hp&_r=0 (showing how Muslim Americans in general struggle with dual identities
and seek multiculturalism model).
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should not be actionable because of the difficulty in determining what
constitutes unlawful discriminatory.308 Identity-based rather than phenotype-based discrimination—the existing doctrinal model—entangles
courts in defining the “wrong type” of Black, Latino, Muslim, woman, or
other protected group such that an employer is guilty of discriminating
against a subset of a protected class.309 Identity-based claims also risk essentializing protected groups into a pre-determined list of behaviors, attitudes,
norms, and values that must be shown to prove unlawful identity-based
discrimination.310 The criteria are often defined by male gatekeepers of a
particular minority community, which can perpetuate intra-group disparities based on gender and minority status within the group.311
While such critiques are well founded, they under-estimate the harm
caused by pressures to assimilate into an identity imposed by the dominant
group to perpetuate a system that subordinates minority groups—precisely
what the Civil Rights Act was aimed to prohibit.312 Institutional pressures
to emulate and assimilate into the norms, values, and behaviors of the
dominant group signals to low status groups that their cultural and racial
characteristics are unbefitting of a “professional” workplace, and as a result
are unwelcome.313 Moreover, coercive assimilationist policies, even if implicitly enforced through identity performance pressures, create a dispiriting environment that penalizes individual authenticity,314 stifles
creativity, increases health risks, and creates hierarchies of power among
out-groups based on their ability to effectively perform their identity to
serve the interests of the dominant group.315 All the while, the dominant
social group’s work performance is unimpeded by coercive demands to
308.
Ford, supra note 4, at 1811. See also Ayres, supra note 11, at 2432 (discussing the
“special rights backlash” when the extent and nuances of discrimination is disclosed to the majority group); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (noting that Title VII’s
primary objective was not merely to provide redress but to prevent harm); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
309.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 3; RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE,
188-90 (2005).
310.
Gonzalez, supra note 69, at 2198, 2211. See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 38-40
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
311.
See NABER, supra note 40, at 159, 188 (2012). See generally KHAN, supra note 74.
312.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 19 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430
(1971); see also Gonzalez, supra note 69, at 2213 (warning against taking to the extreme critiques
of essentialism because it invites a debilitating regime of formalistic color-blindness).
313.
See SHACHAR, supra note 25, at 25.
314.
But see Naber, supra note 40, at 247-48 (noting the conflicted negotiations of Arab
American concepts of “cultural authenticity” entangled in dominant U.S. Orientalist concepts of
Arabness).
315.
Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, supra note 37, at 145 (arguing that the experience of
repeated rejection by others, especially those in the dominant social group, leads to feelings that
one’s existence is meaningless and without value); Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace
Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C.L. REV. 379 (2008); but see Green, supra
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look, act, speak, and live like someone else, which frees them to channel
their mental energy and time towards bona fide work performance rather
than stereotype-based identity performance.316
As discussed in the next section, the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse Cooper v. Hopkins struck down workplace rules that placed
women in a double bind, such that accommodating one stereotype triggers
violation of another stereotype resulting in adverse treatment regardless
how the woman behaves. Similar considerations should be made in cases
involving Muslim women who face a more taxing triple bind.
B. Price Waterhouse Cooper and Gender Stereotyping
Stereotyping can be ascriptive or prescriptive.317 Ascriptive stereotyping “assumes that an individual possesses certain traits and attributes
because of her group membership.”318 Her ascriptive status is not dependent on her individual conduct, cannot be changed, and is presumed to be
determined at birth.319 In ascriptive gender stereotyping, for example,
women are assumed to be genetically inferior to men in intelligence. Long
before the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ann Hopkins in Price
Waterhouse Cooper v. Hopkins, ascriptive sex stereotyping had been struck
down as unlawful.320 Prescriptive gender stereotyping, however, is
permissible.
Prescriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer requires that an
employee exhibit certain traits or attributes because of her group membership.321 In the case of Hopkins, her employer demanded that she “walk
note 10, at 629 (acknowledging that using law to eliminate assimilationist work cultures risks
sanitizing rather than equalizing relations in the workplace).
316.
See Yuracko, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that workplace conformity demands require
minority workers to do extra work to meet demands that are coded culturally white). See also
Martinez, supra note 38, at 330 (analyzing how dominant-group controlled institutions may use
power over minority group identity to reinforce group oppression). See generally, DEVON
CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA
(2013).
317.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 7.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. at 35.
320.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (striking down a federal statute that provided dependent benefits for all spouses of male service members, but provided the same benefits to the spouses of
female service members only upon their showing actual dependence on their wives for more
than one-half of their support, because it was based on an assumption that women do not support their husbands); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1971)
(striking down the employer’s no-marriage rule, which applied only to female flight personnel,
because it was based on sex stereotypes about women’s domestic role); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-45 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that an employer
may not discriminate against female employees with young children based on an assumption that
women generally have more child-care responsibilities than men).
321.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 7.
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more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry” because she was a
woman.322 When she failed to do so, she was denied a promotion notwithstanding her successful management of a multi-million government
contract.323 Her superiors criticized her for being “overly aggressive” and
“overcompensat[ing] for being a woman.”324 She was advised to “take a
course at charm school” even though her male counterparts were not penalized for similar behavior. In its opinion, the Supreme Court concluded
that “we are beyond the day when an employer can evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they match the stereotype associated with their
group.”325 While the Court’s ruling suggested a new anti-assimilationist
antidiscrimination doctrine, the conception of stereotyping struck down
by the Court was limited to consciously held beliefs about how women
should behave.326 Implicit stereotyping perpetuating gender conformity
arguably remained outside the decision’s scope.
Kimberly Yuracko has noted that prior to Price Waterhouse’s rhetorical
ban on sex stereotyping, courts finding in favor of female plaintiffs relied
on an unequal burdens test to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable gender conformity demands, as defined by the social norms of the
time.327 So long as the sex-based dress or appearance codes did not place a
disproportionate burden on workers of one sex, whether male or female,
workplace requirements that differentiated based on sex were lawful under
Title VII.328
The unequal burden test is narrowly interpreted to apply only when
gender conformity demands are not justified by conventionally gendered
professional norms.329 Some courts, however, have struck down gender
322.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 at 272.
323.
Id. at 233-34.
324.
Id. at 235.
325.
Id. at 251.
326.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1030-31.
327.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 20; cf. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104,
1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“Under established equal burdens analysis, when an employer’s
grooming and appearance policy does not unreasonably burden one gender more than the other,
that policy will not violate Title VII.”); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“A sex-differentiated appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and
women is disparate treatment that must be justified as a [bona fide occupational qualification].”).
328.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 20.
329.
See, e.g., id. at 23; see also Fagan v. National Cash Register, 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a short hair requirement for male employees because
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a company’s place in
public estimation. That the image created by its employees dealing with the public
when on company assignment affects its relations is so well known that we may
take judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favorable acceptance.
Good grooming regulations reflect a company’s policy in our highly competitive
business environment.
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specific workplace practices that stigmatize women. In the case of
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., for example, the court
struck down the requirement that women wear uniforms while men could
wear professional business attire of their choosing.330 The court reasoned
that sex differentiation consistent with conventional gender norms stigmatizes female employees.331
The linchpin of Price Waterhouse lies in the double bind test. The
Court held that employees were prohibited from imposing gender conformity demands that conflicted with professional role demands.332 In
Hopkins’ case, her employer demanded that she be demure, ladylike and
hide her ambitions notwithstanding that successful performance of her job
required her to be assertive and overtly competitive—traditionally male
attributes.333 Hopkins was in a double bind wherein her employer placed
her in “an intolerable and impermissible Catch 22: out of a job if [she]
behave[d] aggressively and out of a job if [she] d[id] not. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind.”334 Consequently, the court applied the double
See also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that “a
pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide”
is “tangential to the essence of the business involved”). But see Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111-12
(holding that casino was not in violation of Title VII in requiring female employees to wear
makeup at work whereas men were not required to do the same).
330.
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F.Supp. 263 (S.D.Ohio
1987).
331.
Id. at 266.
332.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
333.
Id. at 235. But see E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1353 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding women’s lack of interest in a job that was
advertised as requiring a person with a lot of drive and physical rigor, socially dominant, and has
an aggressive, assertive, and competitive personality was due to the masculine job description and
hiring criteria notwithstanding that such criteria was not proven necessary for successful job
performance).
334.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. Subsequent cases brought by male employees relied
on Price Waterhouse to claim that they were discriminated against for acting overly feminine. See,
e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Nichols
v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d
563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997). Several other circuits have endorsed similar protection in principle.
See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]
plaintiff may be able to prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by
presenting evidence that the harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not
conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender.”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d
Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).
Female workers harassed for their perceived masculinity have also received protection. See, e.g.,
Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224, 1229 (D. Or. 2002)
(denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had presented evidence such that a jury could find she had been harassed because she was deemed inappropriately
masculine in her traits and appearance). Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d
Cir. 1996); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Longo v. Carlisle
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539
F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir.
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bind principle broadly to include tensions, in addition to direct conflicts,
between gender conformity demands and professional role demands.335
Although the double bind concept would logically be extended to racial,
ethnic, and religious conformity demands arising out of stereotyping and
implicit bias, the courts have declined to do so.
C. Applying Stereotyping To Race, Ethnicity, and Religion
In stark contrast to gender, courts are unsympathetic to claims based
on racial, ethnic, or religious identity demands.336 Some scholars argue this
is a result of a pervasive belief within the judiciary that most Americans are
now “colorblind” such that courts make minimal effort to understand the
various stereotypes and racialized performance demands that minorities
have to comply with in order to acquire and maintain employment.337 So
long as conformity demands fit conventional professional norms—even if
defined by white, middle-class, male dress and behavior—courts are unconcerned with the extra burdens in time, money, and energy costs imposed on minority employees.338 Courts often accept non-gender related
conformity demands as uniform such that whatever burdens on racial or
ethnic minorities exist are not the burdens that courts recognize for purposes of Title VII stereotyping jurisprudence.339
And yet employers may use workplace rules to communicate and
reinforce their antipathy for particular racial and ethnic groups.340 When
such practices are challenged in court, employers successfully argue that
requirements to speak only English in the workplace;341 prohibit cornrows, braids, or dreadlocks;342 or uncover one’s hair are voluntary. Courts
routinely discount the psychological and dignitary harms suffered by employees pressured to perform their racial or ethnic identities in accordance
with the socially dominant group’s demands.343 Employees who perform
1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v.
Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488
F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
335.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 28.
336.
Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1355; Yuracko, supra note 1, at 44.
337.
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A
Critique of the New Equal Protection, 13-17, 55-57 (forthcoming, copy on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409691.
338.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 31-32.
339.
Id. at 31-32.
340.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1140-41.
341.
See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
342.
Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that
braided hairstyles are a personal choice rather than a protected immutable racial or gender characteristic). See also Michelle L. Turner, The Braided Uproar: A Defense of My Sister’s Hair and a
Contemporary Indictment of Rogers v. American Airlines, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 136-40
(2001).
343.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1140-41.
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their racial or ethnic identities in ways that trigger a cultural code associated with a low status group find themselves penalized and stigmatized.344
In the case of Black women, for example, they must straighten out, curl
up, or cover their natural hair to be accepted by and assimilate into white
majoritarian society.345 In the case of Muslim women, they must uncover
their hair and bodies and disassociate from their purportedly backward religion and culture. But courts overlook the racial or ethnic animus rooted
in negative stereotypical assumptions that causes an employer to categorically bar certain racial or ethnic behaviors.346
Courts’ narrow interpretations of Title VII, therefore, protect only
involuntary displays of biological or visible characteristics or morphologies
associated with a low status racial or ethnic group.347 Performed traits of a
person that are part of an employee’s racial, ethnic, or religious identity are
viewed as outside Title VII’s purview, notwithstanding the absence of a
Congressional record barring claims involving voluntary performance
identity.348 This leaves employers with unfettered discretion to discriminate among low status employees based on appearance, behavior, or other
traits. Employees who are able or willing to perform their identities to
comport with coercive assimilationist demands will be hired, retain their
jobs, and receive higher quality assignments, better training opportunities,
promotions, and pay increases.349 The same members of the low status
group who do not or cannot convert, pass, or cover their low status identities find themselves adversely treated with no legal recourse under Title
VII.350
Courts glean over the underlying biases and instead interpret the employer’s behavior and dress codes as a matter of personal choice rather than
racial or ethnic status.351 Indeed, if choice and personal preference are the
344.

Id. at 1165.

345.

Id. at 1387.

346.

See id. at 1162.

347.

Id. at 1140.

348.
Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1355; Rich, supra note 5, at 1138; Perea, supra note
11, at 839-40; Yoshino, supra note 13, at 937.
349.
See, e.g., Green, supra note 10, at 638-40 (discussing the business literature about the
ways firms use cultural “fit” to decide whether to hire an applicant or promote an employee).
350.
Take for instance Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), where
Latino bilingual workers challenged the employer’s English-only rule as national origin discrimination. The employer prohibited workers from speaking Spanish in the workplace including
during breaks. In coming to this conclusion, the court focused on whether the requirement was
a matter of choice and personal preference while overlooking the implicit stereotyping arising
from this rule. Id. In coming to this conclusion, the court focused on whether the requirement
was a matter of choice and personal preference while overlooking the implicit stereotyping arising from this rule. In effect, the employer’s No English rule communicated an antagonism towards Hispanics that retained their Spanish language. Id.
351.
Yuracko, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that courts focus on compliance costs and if they
are deemed low, then employer rules are viewed as a matter of permissible personal choice and
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proper criteria, then Ann Hopkins should have lost her case as she could
have voluntarily chosen to wear makeup, act more stereotypically feminine, and dress in skirts and heels. But the court found such expectations
were discriminatory because they imposed gender stereotypes on female
employees not imposed on male employees when no evidence existed that
the gender conformity demands objectively related to work performance.
What judges fail to take into account is the racialization over time of
certain social interactions, behavior, speech, religious beliefs, and physical
traits other than skin color.352 Just as skin color, eye color, and nose shape
are associated with particular races or ethnic groups; certain dialects, aesthetics, and mannerisms are associated with race and ethnic status.353 For
example, all-braided hairstyles, cornrows, and dreadlocks trigger assumptions about the person’s African, African American, or West Indian ancestry.354 Likewise, saris, bindis, and pashminas are associated with Southeast
Asian women, thereby triggering perceptions of these groups.355 Categorical workplace prohibitions of Spanish, Arabic, or other foreign languages
associated with low status groups reflects a discriminator’s negative reactions and stereotypes of a particular racial or ethnic group. Penalizing benot unlawful racial status); see also Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving a challenge to an airline’s no-cornrows requirement for flight attendants where the court emphasized the that the African American female plaintiff could easily
comply physically with the policy by covering her hair or wearing it in a bun). But see where the
traits at issue have been medicalized. Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 469 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (holding that a no-beard policy was not racially discriminatory when applied to an
employee whose beard was an important part of his racial identity); Keys v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank
& Trust Co. of Chi., 357 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (same); In re Pac. Sw. Airlines, 77
LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 320, 320 (1981) (Jones, Jr., Arb.) (holding that employer could enforce
its no-beard policy against a pilot who “had become rather attached to [his] beard” and did not
want to shave it).
352.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1145 (defining performance-based racial and ethnic ascription
as stereotypes triggered by race or ethnicity-associated behaviors); Neil Gotanda, Comparative
Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1692 (2000)
(describing the racialization of national origin and race in Chinese culture); Naber, supra note
40, at 302-03 (explaining that racialization is an unstable and de-centered complex of social
meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (Michael Apple ed.) (1986) (explaining
that racialization is “an unstable and ‘de-centered’ complex of social meanings constantly being
transformed by political struggle”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1575, 1575-76 (2002) (discussing the racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans after the September 11th attacks).
353.

Rich, supra note 5, at 1158.

354.

Id. See generally, Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis, supra note 108, at 347.

355.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1158. See, e.g., Naber, supra note 40, at 302 (asserting that antiArab and anti-Muslim animus can be viewed as part of a dynamic process of racialization and
points out three ways in which Arabs and Muslims have been racialized: through political violence exercised by extremist groups in the Middle East, by xenophobic violence targeting Arabs
on the local level, and through hostility arising from international crises affecting United States
and its citizens).
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havior that does not mimic the social dominant group values burdens
minority employees with obligations to convert, pass, or cover their identities that impose psychological and dignitary costs.356
As a result, courts should be more skeptical of vague, but unavoidably
subjective, definitions of professionalism. Professionalism codes that convey
a symbolic message of the inferiority of certain cultural, ethnic, or racial
behaviors should be struck down. In making such determinations, courts
should look at the facts from a historical and contemporary social perspective to determine if the mandated physical appearance or behavior is constitutive of race, gender, or ethnicity.357 Courts would inquire into
whether a significant part of the racial or ethnic community at issue would
see the challenged workplace policy as racially motivated. If so, then the
court would presume that socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes influenced the decision maker, causing judges to be more probing in the
alleged non-discriminatory purpose of the workplace rule at issue.358 For
instance, judges should inquire whether the employer penalized dressing or
behaving in a racially or ethnically salient manner because it caused discomfort to the socially dominant group or in fact harmed work product.
In sum, the employer’s conscious deployment of negative stereotypes
should not be the only means of finding a violation of Title VII. Instead,
judges should acknowledge that implicit stereotypes may have infected the
employer’s professionalism codes such that behaviors, speech, and dress
commonly associated with low status groups are banned in the workplace
with no legitimate work-related justification.
D. Addressing the Case of Muslim Women of Color
Like other low status groups, Muslim women of color must work to
prove to their employers that they do not fit multiple negative stereotypes.
They must work harder to prove they are independent thinkers and able to
take on responsibility to counter stereotypes that they are meek, oppressed,
and subjugated.359 They must work harder to prove they are loyal team
356.
Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1390; see also Part I of this Article for a detailed
discussion of the psychological harms caused by stereotyping, stigma, and prejudice.
357.
Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1384; Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 2541, 2544 (1994); see also Tyson v. Clarian Health Partners, 2004 WL 1629538, *6 (S.D.
Ind. June 17, 2004) (describing the Seventh Circuit’s consideration of a “mosaic” of circumstantial evidence in finding intent including comments by supervisors, suspicious timing, and inconsistent explanations or behaviors); see also Gotanda, supra note 50, at 39 (advocating that “judicial
review of race-based legislation should recognize the historical content of race”); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 330 (1987) (describing racism as a part of our common historical experience to be
incorporated into law).
358.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1170; see also Green, supra note 10, at 654.
359.
See Naber, supra note 40, at 82 (arguing that Arab women are often portrayed as weak,
mute, covered in black, or as scarcely clad belly dancers).
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players who are grateful to be in America. They must work harder to
prove they are respectful of male authority and adherents to conventional
American gender roles in the workplace. And as they maneuver through
conflicting identity performance pressures, they not only risk failing to
negotiate the contradictions but they also suffer palpable psychological
costs. The disparate identity performance demands remind them of their
status as members of stigmatized groups. Their mental energies are taxed
attempting to accommodate the contradictions while their coworkers benefit from the autonomy to be their authentic selves. The Muslim women
who fail or are unwilling to accommodate coercive assimilationism are
eventually demoted or terminated only to face courts indifferent to their
plight.360
After investing years of her life in college, a professional Muslim
woman is vested in her career and seeks to create a better financial future
for her children. Losing her job as a result of failing to accommodate assimilationist pressures threatens her aspirations for social mobility as well as
her identity as a professional, career woman. At the same time, she may
identify with her religious and ethnic communities that provide her with a
support network, a sense of self, and a welcoming space to raise her children. But unlike women from the socially dominant group, she faces contradictory pressures to perform her identity that strips her of individual
autonomy over developing an authentic hybridized identity that reflects
her diverse experiences.361 She seeks to rethink and reposition herself
within her Muslim community as a woman who believes in gender equality and the right to choose how to live her life. She also seeks to create a
space for herself within mainstream society wherein she can have access to
professional success and opportunity while overtly maintaining an individualized Muslim and ethnic identity.362
Muslim women of color, therefore, find themselves in a unique position wherein they face a triple bind.363 The traits necessary to succeed in a
“professional” white collar work environment and a “Good Muslim
Woman”—independent thinking, assertiveness, ambition, and drive—are
the same traits that trigger racial, ethnic, and religious stereotypes against
women, Muslims, and ethnic minorities.364 Following the findings in Ann
360.
See Mirza v. Neiman Marcus Group, No. 06-cv-6484, 2009 WL 3824711, at *3;
Compl. for Pl., Spence v. LaHood, No. 1:11-cv-03972-JBS-AMD (D.N.J. July 5, 2011);
Compl. for Pl. ¶¶ 11-15, Zayed v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C-04-01781 JW (N.D. Cal. Nov.
15, 2005).
361.

KHAN, supra note 74, at 125.

362.

Id. at 67, 70.

363.

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).

364.
See, e.g., Zainalizadeh v. Neiman Marcus Grp., No. C 01-4207 JL, 2002 WL
31007465, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2002) (Muslim woman alleging that she received bad evaluations because she was “too aggressive” and “too strong”).
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Hopkins’s case,365 courts should be more thoughtful and inquisitive in
identifying whether stereotyping and implicit bias was a “motivating factor” in an adverse employment action.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that courts consider the following
three factors in employment discrimination cases involving Muslim
women of color: (1) does the employer’s expectations and evaluation of
the Muslim woman employee impose an unequal burden on identity performance compared to other employees who are not Muslim women of
color; (2) are the employer’s actions or rules motivated in part by negative
stereotypes of Muslim women as meek, oppressed, or subjugated; of Muslims as terrorists, disloyal or suspect; or of the employee’s racial or ethnic
group as backward, barbaric, or anti-American;366 and (3) does the employer’s actions or rules effectively stigmatize the Muslim woman employee as an outsider within the workplace.367 In doing so, courts would
proactively consider these factors by looking at the evidence proffered by
the parties, calling on experts in social psychology, stereotyping, and implicit bias, and holistically looking at what constitutes adverse employment
action to look beyond the failure to hire or employment termination to
include unequal access to training, high quality work, interaction with clients, and other opportunities that contribute towards professional
growth.368
In addressing these three factors, courts should look to whether the
traits the Muslim employee is criticized for possessing are traits that her
male and non-Muslim coworkers also possess without penalty. Likewise,
courts should thoughtfully consider whether her penalized traits—for example assertiveness, leadership, critical thinking—are traits that contribute
towards success in her particular profession. Is her employer setting her up
to be a “Good Woman” employee who is deferential, not ambitious in
taking on leadership positions, and in conformity with conventional gen365.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249.
366.
See, e.g., Amna v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, No. 08-CV-2806 (CBA)(LB) 2011
WL 4592787, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (female employee of Pakistani descent complaining of supervisor calling her an “evil” in the office and a coworker saying that plaintiff prays
to animals); see also Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years After
9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 29 (2011) (asserting that the Patriot Act and the FTO designation
process results in that the post-September 11th racialized application of the label of terrorism to
those perceived to be Muslim or Arab, which only serves to foment distrust among domestic and
international Muslim and Arab communities).
367.
See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F.Supp. 263
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (striking down the requirement that women wear uniforms while men could
wear professional business attire of their choosing because the rule was found to stigmatize
women employees); Amna, 2011 WL 4592787, at *2 (alleging that plaintiff was made to feel like
an outsider as the only employee not offered rides to job sites in state-provided car).
368.
See Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a cognizable adverse
employment action is a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”).
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der norms that doom her to remain at the margins of her profession? Similarly, is her strength of personality and drive tainted by stereotypes of
Muslims and her ethnic group as aggressive and backward, leading to her
being labeled a trouble maker and insubordinate when others outside her
identity groups are not stigmatized for similar characteristics?369
For Muslim women whose religious identity entails visual “markers”
such as headscarves, noticeably conservative dress, and requests for religious accommodation, courts should look to the cumulative effect on the
employee. Rather than narrowly focus on whether the religious accommodation was in fact granted, courts should inquire as to whether her
Muslim identity performance resulted in retaliation through social exclusion from the workplace such that she was subjected to inferior access to
training opportunities that contribute towards better work assignments,
stronger work evaluations, and eventually promotions.370 Courts should
inquire whether the Muslim woman employee was given equal access to
clients, included in relevant meetings, provided the same opportunities as
her coworkers to learn the latest technologies or methodologies in her
profession, and generally treated as an equal member of her team. And if
other Muslim women of color were granted such opportunities, courts
should ask whether the explanation is due to performing assimilationism
or bona fide performance based criteria.
When Muslim women are subjected to offensive racial or religious
jokes, excluded from social events, and informed of suspicions of their national loyalties, courts should not limit their analysis as to whether such
acts rise to a hostile work environment claim.371 As such, courts should
recognize as evidence of adverse employment actions verbal abuse, insults,
unfair criticism, inferior training opportunities, inaccessibility to business
development opportunities, or excessive scrutiny.372 Even if such acts
369.
Green, supra note 10, at 664 (noting that courts accept employers’ narratives that
outsiders are the problem, not the employer’s work culture that produces insiders and outsiders
along gender, racial, religious, or ethnic lines); see also Choudhury, supra note 247, at 4-5 (claiming that an unidimensional understandings of Muslims make subordination easier).
370.
See, e.g., Compl. for Pl. ¶¶ 11-15, Zayed v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C-04-01781
JW (ND. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005); see Mirza v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 649 F. Supp. 2d. 837, 845
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (alleging preferential treatment to Pakistani female plaintiff’s colleagues while
threatening to fire plaintiff and giving plaintiff poor work assignments).
371.
See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 34-35, Spence v. LaHood, No. 1:11-cv-03972-JBS-AMD,
2013 WL 355913 (D.N.J. July 5, 2011) (alleging that plaintiff’s FOIA representative said, “You
know they don’t like Muslims here. You suffer the consequences of the choices that you make.
You choose to come in here dressed like that.” Another coworker allegedly told her, “If you take
that rag off your head, you will get somewhere in the FAA.”).
372.
But see Smalls v. Allstate Ins. Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bennett
v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 236, 246-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Similarly, courts should
not blithely disregard “back-scratching, log-rolling, horse-trading, institutional politics, envy,
nepotism, spite, or personal hostility” as non-discriminatory reasons for an employer’s actions.
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1337 (2d Cir. 1997) (abrogated on other grounds by
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)).
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alone are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to meet that standard, they
may and should be considered in disparate treatment claims wherein the
result was failure to promote, demotion, or employment termination. Begrudgingly tolerating employees who do not comport their identity performance to coercive assimilationist demands should not be mistaken for
equality.
Courts must also recognize that promotions and pay raises do not
occur in a vacuum but rather are an accumulation of work performance
integrally linked to the type of work available to an employee and her
social inclusion in the workplace. An employee who is not given the opportunity to take on projects that improve her skills or allow her to exhibit
her leadership skills is doomed to a marginal position in the workplace and
eventually expelled. Over time, this sets her up for a poor work evaluation
and termination at worst or a stagnant professional path at best. Moreover,
courts must scrutinize employers’ common claims that the plaintiff’s personality was the motivation for allegedly poor treatment. Such claims are
often coded bias against minorities who do not conform to assimilationist
demands.
While this Article proposes broader judicial interpretations of what
constitutes disparate treatment on account of race, ethnicity and religion, it
does not propose a change in existing burden shifting tests between parties.
The plaintiff continues to bear the burden of proof to proffer a prima facie
case of discrimination and that the employer’s alleged non-discriminatory
purpose was pretext for unlawful discrimination.373 However, plaintiffs’
evidence of the type discussed above should be more seriously considered
by courts as they take on a more holistic approach that considers the totality of the circumstances. Courts should look beyond a narrow reading of a
performance evaluation and ask whether the employee’s racially and religiously salient identity performance caused the employer to set her up for
failure in contrast to other employees’ whose identities assimilated into the
majority’s demands. When plaintiffs introduce expert evidence by sociologists about the growing anti-Muslim sentiment after September 11th and
negative stereotypes of Muslim women, courts should seriously consider
how this impacts the workplace. Likewise, when social psychologists testify
about the changing face of discrimination from overt to covert bias and
explicit to implicit stereotypes, courts must acknowledge their responsibility in fettering out such bias.
CONCLUSION
While this Article’s proposal presents significant evidentiary challenges, it offers legal recourse to employees subject to discrimination arising from implicit biases rooted in pervasive stereotypes against low status
373.

McDonnell Douglas-Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792-93 (1973).
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groups.374 Victims of implicit bias manifested through coercive assimilationist pressures to perform one’s identity based on the dominant social
group’s expectations are falling through the cracks of Title VII doctrine.375
Members of negatively stereotyped groups expend significant energy
“managing their self-presentation and cultural displays to ensure they communicate competence, character, and commitment in the workplace.”376
They must actively dispel negative stereotypes applied to their group to
avoid animus and stigmatization.377 Toward that end, low identifiers emulate the behaviors, preferences, and norms of higher status groups.378 If
successful, they not only evade discriminatory treatment but also receive
assistance reserved for high status in-group members.379
In the case of Muslim women of color, not only are they denied
individual agency and the choice to live their authentic selves consistent
with their religious and cultural values, but they also face a triple bind. If
they assert independent viewpoints, do not fear challenging male power,
ambitiously seek promotion at work and dress fashionably Western, then
they are admired as a “Good Muslim Woman.” But the admiration for
defying the yokes of purported Muslim and Arab cultural gender oppression is short lived. Their assertiveness soon becomes a liability that violates
American gender norms that treat ambition as a flaw when applied to
women.380 Moreover, their outspoken personalities and intrepidness in expressing critical views deem them a suspicious Muslim whose loyalties are
questioned as an insubordinate employee in violation of American racial
hierarchies.381
374.
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 47 (2013); Bandsuch, supra note 11, at 287
(footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the replacement of extreme acts of
discrimination with more subtle forms of prejudiced “second generation of trait discrimination”
animated by professionalism); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1035-36 (identifying the type of
evidence that can be proffered to prove discrimination based on implicit bias).
375.
See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 1, at 4; cf. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 6, at 1054. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, “Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise . . . .” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 93 S. Ct. at 1824 (1973)). See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
272 (1989); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 n.31 (1977); McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 n.8 (1976).
376.
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 10, at 379.
377.
Cf. Yoshino, supra note 13, at 772.
378.
Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 82, at 254.
379.
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 142, 162 (discussing studies that showed that
“White Americans consistently received more help than Black Americans,” showing that harm
done to Black Americans comes in the form of inaction—the absence of “in-group favoritism”—in addition to active mistreatment).
380.
SANDBERG, supra note 42, at 17. Borgida et al., supra note 46, at 613, 620-22.
381.
Aziz, supra note 111, at 227; Carbado & Gulati, Conversations at Work, supra note 26, at
103 (analyzing the repressive impact that stereotypes have on identity performance in the workplace); See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and
Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997) (discussing the theory of racial
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By highlighting the psychological burdens and an irreconcilable
triple bind imposed on Muslim women of color, this Article echoes other
scholars’ calls for a broader definition of race that includes physical appearance, language, associations, cultural activities and other mutable racial or
ethnic characteristics.382 Rather than focus on morphology or the voluntary nature of a workplace rule, courts should determine whether certain
workplace rules devalue cultural group status such that they perpetuate
divisive cultural group status contests and stigmatize low status groups.383
Workplace rules that impose performance behaviors that reify racial and
ethnic hierarchies in the workplace, and yet have no proven effect on work
performance, should be struck down as violating Title VII. And employers
should bear the burden of proving that such rules do not devalue or stigmatize certain racial, ethnic, or religious groups.384
Toward that end, the Supreme Court’s unequal burden test in PriceWaterhouse should be expansively interpreted to include the psychological
and dignitary harms imposed by coercive assimilationism. Courts should
take seriously plaintiffs’ evidence that she had to work harder than her
coworkers, not only at her job, but at overcoming assumptions of inferior
competence, suspicions of disloyalty, perceptions of her foreignness, and
other stigmatized traits rooted in negative stereotypes about Muslim
women, Muslims, women, and her ethnic group. The more evidence she
can show that she was stigmatized as an “other” in the workplace, the
more a court should scrutinize the employer’s allegedly non-discriminatory purpose to inquire whether in fact unlawful bias was a motivating
factor in the adverse employment action.385 Adverse employment actions
should be interpreted broadly to include cultural profiling and imposing
hierarchy as it relates to immigrants). See also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Racialization of Genomic
Knowledge, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 943-50 (1997) (discussing racial identity and the Genome Project).
382.
See Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1369; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987); Gotanda, supra note 50, at 21.
383.

Rich, supra note 5, at 1158; Greene, Title VII, supra note 10, at 1393.

384.
Rich, supra note 5, at 1159 (noting that performance-based ascription is discriminatory when it devalues a person because she appears to belong to a particular race or ethnic
group).
385.
See the cases involving the Age Discrimination in Employment Act where courts
acknowledge that an employer can be “motivated” by an applicant or employee’s age through
the operation of implicit stereotypes: Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155
(7th Cir. 1981) (holding that age discrimination may arise from an unconscious application of
stereotyped notions of ability); La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405,
1410 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Age discrimination may be subtle and even unconscious.”); Burlew v.
Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989). In contrast, in Title VII cases, courts do not
find that increased scrutiny or reprimand by a supervisor rises to the level of a “materially adverse
action.” See, e.g., Spence v. LaHood No. 11-3972 JBS/AMD, 2013 WL 355913, at *11 (D.N.J.
Jan. 28, 2013), (citing McKinnon v. Gonzales, 642 F. Supp. 2d 410, 426 (D.N.J. 2009).
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work cultures based on subjective criteria defined solely by dominant social group norms.386
In the end, the excessive deference courts grant to employers needs
to be reined in. At stake is far more than an employer’s autonomy to conduct his workplace to pursue higher profits. The ability of a diverse society
comprised of multiple religions, races, and ethnicities to be inclusive and
offer a fair chance to every citizen contributes to a politically stable society
not plagued by separatism and segregation. Making equal opportunity
meaningfully available rather than merely empty promises in employer policies contributes towards America’s success in an increasingly globalized
economy.387

386.
Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN 89, 89 (2000);
Green, supra note 10, at 627.
387.
Brief for Amici Curiae, 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents
at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 36 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief for Amici Curiae, Media
Companies in Support of Respondents at 8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 36 (2003) (No. 02241).

